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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early part of 1997, NationsBank, N.A., one of the
largest banks in the United States, fired a resounding shot throughout
the banking world when it applied to establish an operating
subsidiary to develop residential condominiums on land where the
bank operated a local branch.' The bank fired a second shot on that
same day by applying to use a subsidiary to engage in certain real
estate lease financing transactions.2 The proposal to engage in real
estate activities roused the banking community, with Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan warning that approval of the applications
"would take national banks down a road that Congress has
historically barred."3  Soon thereafter, Zions First National Bank
applied for permission for its subsidiary to underwrite, deal in, and
invest in municipal revenue bonds, an activity equally controversial
1. See Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-07, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,213 (1997), also available
on the Internet at Proposals Out for Comment (visited Mar. 4, 1998)
<http://vww.oce.treas.gov/propregs.htmn>.
2. See Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-06, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1997), also available
on the Internet at Proposals Out for Comment (visited Mar. 4, 1998)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/propregs.htm>.
3. Fed Strongly Opposes NationsBank Real Estate Development Proposal, BANKING
POL'y REP., June 2, 1997, at 5, available in WESTLAW, Bnkpr Library (reporting
Greenspan's observation that similar real estate investments led to the S&L debacle of the
1980s). The applications also galvanized members of Congress, including Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), who criticized the NationsBank
applications. See, e.g., Pamela Atkins, D'Amato Pledges to Push Roukema Bills, Plans
New Financial Services Reform Bill, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 833 (May 5, 1997); Pamela
Atkins, Treasury Searching for Winning Approach on Thorny Financial Services Reform
Issue, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 784 (Apr. 28, 1997) (suggesting NationsBank application
may lead House Republicans to urge Congress to prevent regulators from upstaging
Congressional turf). Real estate professionals also feared that approval of the application
could "lead to banks having too much involvement in non-traditional banking activities,
such as real estate development, investment, and brokerage." NAR Has Doubts on
NationsBank Application, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 706 (Apr. 14, 1997).
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because of the traditional prohibition against commercial banks
engaging in investment banking.4
These applications were made possible when new
regulations5 issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), the regulator of national banks, became effective December
31, 1996,6 almost two years after their original introduction in
November of 1994.' The controversial8 new section 5.34 allows
4. Like the NationsBank applications, the Zions application also caused some alarm in
Congress. See, e.g., Roukema Objects to Bank's Request to Underwrite Municipal Revenue
Bonds, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 734 (Apr. 21, 1997) (reporting Representative Marge
Roukema's (R-NJ) objection to Zions' application and her suggestion that Congress move
quickly on financial services modernization); Fed Opposes Zions Op-Sub Proposals on
Revenue Bonds, BANKING POL'Y REP., June 16, 1997, at 2, available in WESTLAW, Bnkpr
Library (explaining the Federal Reserve's opposition to the use of operating subsidiaries as
a means of expanding bank activities); Lawmakers Squirm as OCC Considers Zions' Op-
Sub Plan, BANKING POL'Y REP., May 5, 1997, at 4, available in WESTLAW, Bnkpr Library
(reporting Representative Marge Roukema's (R-NJ) introduction of a bill prohibiting banks
from underwriting municipal revenue bonds through operating subsidiaries). The Office of
the Comptroller has approved the application of Zions National Bank, but has yet to act on
the NationsBank applications. See infra notes 127-41, 274 and accompanying text.
5. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-5.70 (1997). The rules under Part 5 govern corporate
application and notice procedures for activities such as organizing a bank, establishing
branches, and engaging in business combinations. This Comment will focus on the changes
specifically made to section 5.34. For further discussion regarding the new part 5
regulations, see James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More of
Same?, 46 DEPAUt L. REV. 651 (1997).
6. The new rules were announced on November 20, 1996 by OCC Chairman Eugene
A. Ludwig. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Green Light for Banks to Sidestep Holding Cos.,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1996, at 1. Ludwig explained that the rules had been on hold for
two years while Congress debated financial modernization, and that the OCC had waited
long enough, especially considering that the debate on financial modernization might
continue for "a very long time indeed." Id. at 2.
7. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Proposed Rule, 59
Fed. Reg. 61,034 (1994). Comptroller Ludwig announced on October 5, 1996 that the
OCC was ready to "dust off" plans to expand the banking industry's sphere of influence.
See Pamela Atkins, OCC Ready to 'Dust Off Regulations Expanding Powers of National
Banks, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 620 (Oct. 14, 1996). Ludwig explained to the American
Bankers Association (ABA) that "we should assume that the 'business of banking' is
sufficiently broad and flexible that a bank can engage in any financial activity or activity
incident to financial services that benefits its customers." Id.
8. The regulations were denounced by members of Congress, Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, and various trade groups. See generally Niles S. Campbell,
OCC Rule Expands Bank Business Lines; Operating Subsidiary Section Draws Fire, 67
Banking Rep. (BNA) 873 (Nov. 25, 1996). Senate Banking Committee Chairman Alfonse
D'Amato said the issuance of the new regulations was a bad move which "may subject
federally insured banks to excessive risks and exposes bank insurance funds . . . to
unnecessary liability" as well as "detract[ing] from the emerging consensus in favor of
comprehensive [Congressional] reform [of banking law]." Id. Representative John Dingell
(D-MI), ranking minority member on the House Commerce Committee, said OCC
Comptroller Ludwig should be removed from office for making bad policy decisions which
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operating subsidiaries of national banks to engage in activities
prohibited to the parent bank so long as the OCC determines that the
activities are "part of or incidental to the business of banking" or
otherwise authorized by law and that the limitation applicable to the
bank does not apply to the subsidiary.9 In its preamble announcing
the new regulations, the OCC specifically said that it would not
necessarily approve the subsidiaries' requests to engage in an activity
prohibited to the parent bank, but that it intended to evaluate
applications on a case-by-case basis."
This Comment first describes the provisions of the old and
new section 5.34, the legal authority behind the changes, and the
criticisms to them." Next, it discusses the two applications
submitted by NationsBank, N.A. (NationsBank) to engage in real
estate developing and real estate lease financing, and the legal
arguments submitted for and against approval of the applications.2
The Comment then describes the application submitted by Zions
First National Bank (Zions) to underwrite the sale of municipal
revenue bonds, and the analysis applied by the OCC to approve the
applications. 3 After describing the applications, the Comment
analyzes the legal issues presented by each of fhem."4 Lastly, this
Comment discusses whether each of the applications should be
approved and the impact that the new regulations may have on
financial modernization. 5
advanced the interests of banks over those of consumers. See Pamela Atkins, Dingell Blasts
National Bank Regulator and Call for Removal on Policy Grounds, 68 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 689 (Apr. 14, 1997).
9. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34(d), (f) (1997). The language of the regulation is similar to
the "incidental" powers clause of section 24 (Seventh), which grants national banks "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." 12
U.S.C. 24 (Seventh) (1994).
10. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341,
60,352 (1996).
11. See infra notes 16-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 60-121 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 142-252 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 253-75 and accompanying text.
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II. PART 5 REGULATIONS
The operating subsidiary rule under the old Part 5
Regulations (Old Part 5) offered a narrow scope of activities in
which a subsidiary of a national bank could engage. 16 A national
bank 'was allowed to use an operating subsidiary to engage only in
those activities allowed for the parent bank as "part of or incidental
to the business of banking."' 7 In order to qualify for Part 5 treatment,
the parent bank was required to own at least eighty percent of the
voting stock of the subsidiary.18  The Old Part 5 spelled out
application procedures which required that a national bank intending
to acquire, establish, or perform new activities in an operating
subsidiary submit a letter to the Deputy Comptroller.19  The
Comptroller would then conduct a review of the bank's application
to determine if "the proposed activities exceed[ed] those legally
permissible for a national bank's operating subsidiary" and to
guarantee "prudent banking principles."'  Unless it was notified
otherwise, a bank could begin operations through the operating
subsidiary thirty days after the Comptroller received the bank's
letter."'
The new Part 5 Regulations (Regulations) significantly
change the scope of permissible activities as well as the application
procedures for the establishment and operation of operating
subsidiaries.2 The Regulations clarify the form which an operating
subsidiary may take, providing that a national bank may invest in a
corporation, limited liability company, or similar entity.'z While the
16. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(c) (1996); see also Smoot, supra note 5, at 663-64.
17. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(c).
18. See id.
19. See id. § 5.34(d)(1)(i).
20. Id. § 5.34(d)(1)(iii).
21. See id. § 5.34(d)(1)(ii). The Old Part 5 also provided that banks could establish or
acquire an operating subsidiary in less than 30 days if so notified by the OCC. See id.
22. See id. § 5.34(c) (1997); see also Smoot, supra note 5, at 664-72.
23. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2). The OCC said that authorizing investments in different
types of entities increases the flexibility of national banks to structure their activities. See
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,350
(1996). In a press release, the OCC also noted that general partnerships were another type
of activity available to the operating subsidiary which is not available to the parent. See
Questions and Answers on Part 5, News Release 96-129, Nov. 20, 1996 (visited Mar. 4,
1998) <http:/www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/96%2D129.txt>.
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Old Part 5 required a parent bank to own more than eighty percent of
the voting interest in a subsidiary, the Regulations now provide that
parent banks must only own fifty percent or otherwise control the
subsidiary. 4
The Regulations also restructure the OCC approval
procedures by dividing operating subsidiary proposals into three
categories: after-the-fact notice, expedited processing (for financially
strong and well-managed banks), and standard processing." For
certain activities, banks which are "adequately capitalized" or "well
capitalized" may acquire or establish operating subsidiaries and
simply provide after-the-fact notice to the OCC within ten days of
acquiring or establishing the subsidiary.26 Under expedited review,
an eligible bank submits an application with the OCC which is
deemed approved ten days after the filing, unless notified
otherwise.27 Standard processing, which applies when a bank
proposes new activities that do not qualify for after-the-fact or
expedited review, requires a bank to submit an application and
receive approval from the OCC before acquiring or establishing the
subsidiary or before commencing the new activity.2"
The most controversial change stems from the increased
authority of the Comptroller to approve new activities for bank
subsidiaries that are prohibited to the parent. The Regulations
reiterate that a bank may use a subsidiary to conduct activities that
are "part of or incidental to the business of banking, as determined by
the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to 12 U.S.C. [§] 24
24. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2). Additionally, no other party may control more than
50% of the voting interest of the subsidiary. See id.; see also Smoot, supra note 5, at 686-
92.
25. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
60,349.
26. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2). The new rule defines activities which will qualify for
after-the-fact notice to include, among other things, holding property in the course of debt
collection, providing business services to the bank, and selling money orders. See id. §
5.34(d)(2)(ii)(A)-(M).
27. See id. § 5.34(e)(3). Activities eligible for expedited review include, among other
things, providing securities brokerage, underwriting and dealing in securities permissible
for national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), and data processing. See id. §
5.34(e)(3)(ii)(A)-(G). The new rule also allows banks to establish operating subsidiaries
without filing an application or providing notice for certain other activities. See id. §
5.34(e)(4).
28. See id. § 5.34(e)(1)(i)(A).
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(Seventh). 29  In addition, the new section 5.34(f) significantly
expands permissible operating subsidiary activities by allowing
subsidiaries to engage in "an activity authorized under section
5.34(d) for the subsidiary but different from that permissible for the
national bank. 30
The Regulations set out three types of requirements to ensure
that new activities are conducted safely and soundly.' First, the
"notice and comment" requirements provide that if the OCC has not
previously approved a proposed activity, a public notice and an
opportunity for comment on the application is required.3' Second,
there are "corporate requirements" which mandate that certain
corporate formalities be followed in order to ensure that the
subsidiary remains separate and distinct from its parent.32 Lastly, the
Regulations establish specific "supervisory safeguards" when the
subsidiary participates in new activities.33  For example, one
supervisory safeguard requires that the parent bank qualify as an
"eligible bank" before and after commencement of the activity and
after taking into account the capital deduction it is required to make
for its investment in the subsidiary.34 In addition, to ensure arms
29. Id. § 5.34(d). Subsection (d) also permits "other activities permissible for national
banks or their subsidiaries under other statutory authority." Id.
30. Id. § 5.34(f).
31. See id. § 5.34(f)(1). Under these procedures, the applications by NationsBank,
N.A. and First Zions National Bank were published and comment letters were received. See
infra notes 84-103, 118-21, 128 and accompanying text.
32. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)(2). The new rule lists ten "corporate requirements" which
the subsidiary should follow to ensure perception as a separate and distinct entity, adequate
capitalization, arms-length dealing between the parent and subsidiary and autonomy of the
subsidiary from its parent. See id. § 5.34(f)(2)(i)-(x). Pursuant to these requirements, the
subsidiary should be physically separate and distinct from its parent, operate under a name
different from the parent's name, maintain separate accounting and corporate records, and
have a board of directors with at least one third being from outside of the bank's board. See
id.
33. See id. § 5.34(f)(3). The Regulations limit the amount which the parent bank may
invest in the subsidiary by requiring the bank to reduce its capital and total assets by the
amount of the bank's investment in the subsidiary as well as requiring the bank to reduce its
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital by its investment in the subsidiary. See id. § 5.34(f)(3)(i).
34. Id. § 5.34(f)(3)(iiii). Under § 5.3(g) of Part 5, an "eligible bank" means a national
bank that:
(1) Is well capitalized as defined in 12 C.F.R. [§] 6.4(b)(1);
(2) Has a composite rating of I or 2 under the Uniform Financial
Institutions Rating System (CAMEL);
(3) Has a Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 12 U.S.C. [§] 2901 et
seq., rating of "Outstanding" or "Satisfactory"; and
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length dealing between the parent and the subsidiary, the supervisory
requirements apply sections 23A"s and 23B 36 of the Federal Reserve
Act to transactions between the parent bank and subsidiary.37
The OCC has said that in reviewing applications involving
new activities it will consider: "(1) the form and specificity of the
restriction applicable to the parent bank; (2) why the restriction
applies to the parent bank; and (3) whether it would frustrate the
purpose underlying the restriction on the parent bank to permit a
subsidiary of the bank to engage in the particular activity."3  In
addition, the OCC announced that it will also consider the "safety
and soundness implications of the activity," other regulatory
safeguards applying to the subsidiary or the activity itself, conditions
imposed (by the OCC) in conjunction with application approval, and
any additional undertakings by the bank or its operating subsidiary to
address these factors. s9
Several trade associations ("dissenters") opposed the
regulations based on concerns that bank expansion into new lines of
business would risk the safety and soundness of the banking
(4) 'Is not subject'to a cease and desist order, consent order, formal
written agreement ....
Id. § 5.3(g). If the bank ceases to be well capitalized for two consecutive quarters, it must
submit an acceptable plan to the OCC to become well capitalized. See id. § 5.34(f)(3)(iii).
35. Federal Reserve Act § 23A, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994). Section 23A imposes
restrictions on transactions between banking affiliates and banks or their subsidiaries. See
id. § 371c(a)(1). The statute limits transactions between affiliates and banks (or their
subsidiaries) to ten percent of the capital stock and surplus of the bank, per affiliate, with a
total limit of 25% for all affiliates. See id. § 371c(a)(1)(A)-(B). The statute also prohibits
the bank from purchasing "low quality assets" from an affiliate unless made pursuant to an
independent credit evaluation. See id. § 371c(a)(3). In addition, section 23A requires all
transactions be "on terms and conditions that are consistent with safe and sound banking
practices." Id. § 371c(a)(4).
36. Federal Reserve Act § 23B, 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1. Under section 23B, a member
bank and its subsidiaries may engage in transactions with each other only:
(A) On terms and under circumstances, including credit standards, that
are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its
subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions
with or involving other nonaffiliated companies, or
(B) in the absence of comparable transactions, on terms and under
circumstances, including credit standards, that in good faith would be
offered to, or would apply to, nonaffiliated companies.
Id. § 371c-I(a)(l)(A)-(B).
37. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)(3)(ii).




system. 0 The OCC responded to these concerns by reiterating that
safeguards are provided in the Regulations and that new activities
will only be approved on a case-by-case basis.41 The OCC further
explained that applications for new activities would not be approved
unless the bank met certain corporate and supervisory requirements.42
According to the OCC, banks would benefit from conducting certain
activities in a subsidiary, because such organization would allow
more effective management and monitoring of the activities, lessen
potential conflicts of interest, and facilitate the safe and sound
operation of the parent bank.43
The dissenters also opposed the Regulations based on the
portion of section 24 (Seventh) which states: "[e]xcept as hereinafter
provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein shall
authorize the purchase [by the bank] of any shares of stock of any
corporation." The dissenters argued that the statute's language
prohibits a national bank from owning stock in any corporation,
including a subsidiary. 45 The OCC responded by arguing that the
clause only relates to "speculative stock purchases" and does not
prohibit national banks from owning stock in subsidiaries.46  The
OCC cited support for national bank ownership of subsidiaries in the
portion of section 24 (Seventh) that allows national banks to exercise
"all such incidental powers as shall be necessary" to carry on the
business of banking.47 According to the OCC, the term "necessary"
has been interpreted by the courts to mean "convenient and useful, 48
and use of subsidiaries is a convenient and useful way of conducting
the business of banking.49
40. See id. at 60,350-51.
41. See id. at 60,351.
42. See id. at 60,354.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 60,351 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994)).
45. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)). But see Smoot, supra note 5, at 672-86
(concluding that the practice of banks owning subsidiaries is so well established that any
litigation challenging such ownership would most likely fail).
46. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
60,351.
47. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
48. See id. (citing Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972)).
49. See id. at 60,351-52. The OCC pointed to the Supreme Court's holding that
permissible bank activities are not limited to powers enumerated in section 24 (Seventh).
See id. at 60,351 (citing NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
1998)
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Referring to OCC precedent which characterized subsidiaries
as "department[s] of the banks," dissenters argued that it was
inconsistent to allow operations in a subsidiary that are not
permissible in the parent." The OCC explained that its earlier
statements were only "policy positions" and did not represent a legal
determination that operating subsidiaries should never be allowed to
conduct activities different from those of its parent." Furthermore,
the OCC stated that it may modify its policies where the change is
lawful and enhances flexibility.
2
Some dissenters pointed to the traditional separation of
investment and commercial banking. They suggested that sections
16" and 2151 of the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall) prevent the
conduct of commercial and investment banking functions in the same
entity.5  Additionally, the dissenters argued, while the Comptroller
Insurance Co. (VALIC), 513 U.S. 251 (1995)). The OCC noted that it is the Comptroller
who has the "discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated (in
section 24 (Seventh))." Id. (citing VALIC, 513 U.S. at 258, n.2). In addition, the OCC
explained that the 1927 McFadden Act and 1933 Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall)
implicitly accepted the power of national banks to own subsidiaries by placing limitations
on subsidiary activities. See id. at 60,352.
50. See id. at 60,352.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 60,352-53 (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996)).
53. Section 16 is now codified in the Banking Act as 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), which
provides:
[t]he business of dealing in securities and stock by [a bank] shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and
in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite
any issue of securities or stock; Provided, That the association may
purchase for its own account investment securities under such
limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by
regulation prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
54. Section 21 is now embodied in 12 U.S.C. § 378, which provides:
it shall be unlawful-[flor any person, firm, corporation, association,
business trust, or other similar organization engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or
through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in
the business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment
upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other
evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor ....
Id. § 378(a)(1).
55. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
60,353. Dissenters argued that the Banking Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1844, 1846-1850) established the exclusive means by which to engage in activities not
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has the power to prescribe rules and regulations under section 93a,56
he does not have the power to promulgate rules relating to Glass-
Steagall The OCC responded that it was not necessarily allowing
activities that conflict with these rules, but instead was merely
establishing a process by which to approve the applications of banks
to enter into new areas.58 The OCC, furthermore, rejected claims that
it was promulgating regulations beyond its authority, noting that the
regulations do not diminish or otherwise affect application of Glass-
Steagall to national banks.5 9
III. RECENT APPLICATIONS UNDER THE NEW PART 5 REGULATIONS
Although the new Regulations became effective on December
31, 1996, it was not until April 4, 1997 that the first applications
were filed under the new operating subsidiary rule. On March 26,
1997, NationsBank, N.A. filed two separate applications with the
OCC. One requested permission to engage in limited real estate
development activities in connection with bank premises through an
operating subsidiary. 6 The other sought OCC approval to establish
an operating subsidiary to engage in real estate lease financing.62
A. NationsBank Application - Real Estate Development
NationsBank's first application requested permission to
engage in real estate development through a newly-established
operating subsidiary known as Tryon Development Partners.63  The
permissible by banks directly. See id.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 93a.
57. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
60,353. For a more thorough discussion regarding this section 93a argument with regards
to the Zions application, see infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
58. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
60,352-53.
59. See id.
60. See Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-07, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,213 (1997); Operating
Subsidiary Notice 97-06, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1997).
61. See Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-07, 62 Fed. Reg. at 16,213. For more
discussion on the application, see infra notes 63-103 and accompanying text.
62. See Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-06, 62 Fed. Reg. at 16,214. For more details
of the application, see infra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
63. See Letter from Richard K. Kim, NationsBank Assistant General Counsel, to
Stephen J. Weiss, Deputy Controller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency I (Mar. 26,
1998] 273
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application was for a "single specific project" which involved
development of approximately forty-five residential condominium
units on land which the bank had owned for over twenty-five years
and which was presently the site of a NationsBank branch.64
NationsBank stated that the goals of the project are to make its
premises location more economically vibrant and to produce a safer,
more pleasant work environment for its employees and customers. 5
To allay fears concerning future real estate development activities,
the bank noted that future projects would be limited in number and
would be confined to areas "adjacent or near NationsBank
premises. 66 Lastly, to satisfy concerns regarding the organization of
the subsidiary, the bank enumerated fourteen safeguards, similar to
the corporate and supervisory safeguards stipulated in section 5.34(f),
that would be used.67
NationsBank argued that the real estate development
activities were permissible because they were "part of or incidental to
the business of banking" and that approval of the activities would not
be "inconsistent with the policies of section 2968 of the National
1997) (on file with the OCC); see also Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-07, 62 Fed. Reg. at
16,213.
64. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 2. The bank
estimated that the cost of constructing the condominiums would be about $13 million, and
that the combined approximate value of the office building and the land would be $56
million. See id.
65. See id. at l.
66. Id. at 2. NationsBank listed as examples of future projects, construction of an
office building, retail space, or residential housing. See id.
67. See id. at 2-4. These safeguards included a self-imposed requirement that all loans,
investments, and advances to the subsidiary not exceed two percent of the bank's Tier I
capital. See id.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1994). The provisions of section 29 expressly provide that:
A national banking association may purchase, hold, and convey real
estate for the following purposes and for no others:
First. Such as shall be necessary for its accommodation in the
transaction of its business.
Second. Such as shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of
security for debts previously contracted.
Third. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts
previously contracted in the course of its dealings.
Fourth. Such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments, decrees, or
mortgages held by the association, or shall purchase to secure debts due
to it.
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Bank Act."69  Citing the NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.70  decision, NationsBank
maintained that the OCC has broad authority in determining whether
an activity is "part of or incidental to the business of banking.""
NationsBank argued that this determination should be based on
whether the, activity is functionally equivalent to, or a logical
outgrowth of, a recognized banking activity, whether it responds to
customer needs or otherwise benefits the bank or its customers, and
whether it involves risks similar in nature to those already assumed
by banks.7
Applying these factors, NationsBank argued that real estate
development activities would be "functionally equivalent" to other
recognized banking activities because the development of bank
premises is incidental to the conduct of banking.73 Because the
proposed project would develop areas "ancillary to" and "integrated
with" the bank's premises, NationsBank asserted that the activity
itself was also ancillary and incidental to the authority to develop
bank premises.74  The activity responded to customer needs,
NationsBank argued, because the activity would make bank locations
safer and more pleasant.7" Lastly, NationsBank argued that the
activity involved risks similar to those already encountered by the
69. Letter from Richard K. Kim to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 4.
70. 513 U.S. 251 (1995); see infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
71. Letter from Richard K. Kim to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 4 (citing
NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995)). In a prophetic statement at the time of the VALIC decision, NationsBank issued
an official statement commenting that the bank intended "to take advantage of the Supreme
Court's ruling to the fullest extent." R. Christian Bruce, Justices Hold for OCC on
Annuities, Say OCC Sets Reach of Section 24 Powers, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 185 (Jan.
23, 1995).
72. See id. at 4-5 (citing Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Corporate Decision
97-06, at 9 (Jan. 22, 1997) (on file with the OCC) (allowing establishment of an operating
subsidiary to reinsure mortgage insurance based on "business of banking" analysis using
these criteria)).
73. See id. at 5. NationsBank cited the OCC's determination that certain activities "are
incidental to the conduct of the banking business, and therefore permissible, even though
they are not, substantively, banking activities." Id. (citing Memorandum on the Legal
Authority for the Revised Operating Subsidiary Regulation from Julie Williams, Chief
Counsel, to Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency 3 (Nov. 18, 1996)).
74. See id.
75. See id. at6.
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banks because of their experience developing, purchasing, and
selling bank premises of which they only occupied a portion.76
Although NationsBank recognized that section 29 of the
Banking Act expressly prohibits bank ownership of real estate except
in limited circumstances," it focused on the rationale underlying the
limitations in that statute.78 The bank observed that the Supreme
Court had interpreted the purposes of the statute as keeping the
capital of the banks flowing through the daily "channels of
commerce," preventing banks from engaging in "hazardous real
estate speculation," and restraining banks from accumulating large
amounts of real estate.79
NationsBank argued that allowing its subsidiary to be
involved in real estate development transactions would not frustrate
the purposes underlying section 29. NationsBank first noted that the
activities would not hinder capital from flowing into the "channels of
commerce" because all loans, investments, and advances to the
subsidiary would not exceed two percent of the bank's Tier 1
capital.80  Furthermore, the bank would plan to sell the
condominiums as quickly as possible so that the diversion of capital
would be the same as if they had made a loan to a developer for
construction." The "hazardous real estate speculation" risks,
explained NationsBank, would also be minimized by the two percent
limitation confining such activities to a de minimis scale.8" Finally,
NationsBank argued that it would not accumulate large amounts of
real estate because of the de minimis limitations. 3
The real estate development application from NationsBank
drew criticism from many sources, including the Federal Reserve,
76. See id. The bank also noted that banks bear similar risks when they make real estate
secured loans. See id.
77. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1994)). For the text of section 29, see supra note 68.
78. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 6.
79. See id. (citing National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621 (1878) (interpreting the
reasons which underlie the statutory restrictions against national banks owning and loaning
on real estate)).
80. See id. This limitation was self-imposed by the bank. See id.
81. See id. at 8.
82. See id. If the bank ceased to be well-capitalized for two consecutive quarters, it
would submit to the OCC an acceptable plan to become well-capitalized or it would divest
itself of the real estate activity. See id.
83. See id. The bank would also deduct its equity investment from the parent bank's
capital and total assets. See id.
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which attacked the proposal by questioning the OCC's authority to
promulgate the rules in an area subject to Congressional control.'
The Federal Reserve noted that since 1864 "Congress has explicitly
prohibited national banks from owning and developing real estate"
and saw "no reason to overturn the judgment of Congress on this
subject."85  The agency questioned whether Congress intended to
create a statutory scheme allowing express prohibitions on national
banks to be overcome by administrative interpretations of the OCC. 6
Noting the riskiness of real estate ventures, the Federal Reserve
argued that approval would undermine the power of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to limit risky activities of
state banks.8 7
The National Association of Realtors (NAR) also raised
several objections to the NationsBank application for real estate
development.88 NAR argued that banks were unskilled in the real
estate industry. 9 NAR also complained that inadequate firewalls
existed to prevent banks from misusing information they gathered in
their role as lender.90 Furthermore, NAR worried that once one
application for a new activity was approved, it would serve as
precedent for other banks to engage in that activity without specific
authorization."
84. See Letter from William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Board, Federal Reserve System
to Eugene Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency 3 (May 5, 1997) (on file with the OCC).
85. Id. at 1.
86. See id. at 3.
87. See id. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was neutral regarding
the applications but cautioned that real estate development activities are risky to the deposit
insurance funds. See Letter from Ricki Heifer, Chairman, FDIC, to Eugene Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency 3 (May 30, 1997) (on file with the OCC). The letter cited as
statutory authority 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994), which allows state-chartered insured banks to
invest in equity investments of the same type and amount as allowed for national banks.
See id. at 1. The FDIC urged caution in allowing real estate development activities, noting
that the S&L crisis stemmed from risky real estate investments. See id. at 2. The letter also
outlined the FDIC's own experience and criteria used in approving applications to engage
in real estate activities. See id. at 3.
88. See Letter from Stephen D. Driesler, Senior Vice President/Chief Lobbyist,
National Association of Realtors (NAR), to the OCC 3 (May 5, 1997) (on file with the
OCC). The OCC received 144 comment letters regarding the application, most of which
were received from real estate agents. See OCC, Docket 97-07, NationsBank Operating
Subsidiary Notice (1997) (on fil with the OCC).
89. See Letter from Stephen D. Driesler to the OCC, supra note 88, at 3.
90. See id. at 4.
91. See id.
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The Consumer's Union (CU) joined the dissenters and
questioned whether there was any statutory authority for banks'
entrance into real estate development activities.92 CU argued that
under section 29 of the National Bank Act, a bank may only buy,
own, and sell real estate for specific purposes "and no others."93 CU
criticized NationsBank's attempt to characterize the project as proper
under section 29 for the "accommodation of its business," arguing
that condominiums have little relation to a bank's transaction of its
business.9 4 CU also pointed out that other banking legislation, such
as the Bank Holding Company Act, permits real estate leasing
activity but does not authorize real estate development activities.95
Finally, CU challenged the characterization of real estate
development as "incidental" to the "business of banking" under
section 24 (Seventh).96
CU also expressed safety and soundness concerns by
referencing the immense losses the savings and loan organizations
(S&Ls) suffered from real estate investments.97 Specifically, CU
92. See Letter from Mary Griffin, Consumer's Union Insurance Counsel, to the OCC 1-
2 (May 5, 1997) (on file with the OCC). Consumer's Union (CU) describes itself as a
nonprofit educational membership organization which provides "consumers with
information, education, and counsel about goods, services, health, and personal finance"
and which "initiate(s) and cooperate(s) with individual and group efforts to maintain and
enhance the quality of life for consumers." Id. at 1 n. 1. The organization's income is solely
derived from the sale of the magazine Consumer Reports. See id.
93. See id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1994)).
94. See id. at 2. The term "bank premises purpose" of section 29 should be interpreted
narrowly, CU argued. See id. Approving the application, it maintained, would serve as an
incentive for banks to purchase large parcels of land for their bank premises, and develop
areas "adjacent or near" these parcels into retail malls, senior retirement communities, or
other large-scale development properties. See id.
95. See id. The organization noted that attempts by the Federal Reserve in 1987 to
allow bank holding companies to create subsidiaries to engage in direct real estate
investment were quashed by Congress. See id. The Bank Holding Company Act is codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§1841-1844, 1846-1850.
96. See id. CU argued that "financing" real estate involves a much different risk than
the development of real estate. See id. The organization argued that "development" is a
commercial activity because it involves the end-use of credit whereas "financing" involves
an extension of credit and is therefore a banking function. See id. at 3. The National
Association of Home Builders (NAHB) also submitted a letter objecting to the proposal,
arguing that real estate development involves the acquisition of land, preparation of the
infrastructure, and the actual construction of a building which are not "incidental" to a
banks role of deposit taking and lending. See Letter from Kent W. Colton, NAHB
Executive Vice President, to the OCC 2-3 (May 5, 1997) (on file with the OCC).
97. See Letter from Mary Griffin to the OCC; supra note 92, at 3. CU noted that one of
the activities which played a role in the S&L failures was the lending of money to buyers
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noted that the S&Ls which had engaged in real estate investment
activities experienced a higher failure rate than those not involved in
such investments.98 CU argued that any losses incurred by an
operating subsidiary would negatively impact the parent bank and
leave the parent in a weakened financial condition.99
Notwithstanding the above criticisms, several banks and
banking trade associations argued in favor of the NationsBank
application.' One banking trade association, for example, stated
that the activities should be allowed because federal savings
associations are allowed to invest in real estate. °1' Another group
asserted that banks have been involved in real estate development for
their own use for decades without undue safety and soundness
concerns. 102 A third supporter argued that banks understand the risks
involved with real estate and that those risks are adequately
addressed by the safeguards incorporated by section 5.34(f).' 3
B. NationsBank Application - Real Estate Lease Financing
NationsBank's application to engage in real estate lease
financing (RELF) transactions caused less of a stir. The bank
proposed engaging in RELF through a newly-created subsidiary
which would offer the leases on a "nonoperating,"'' "full payout"' 0
5
who purchased land from the thrifts' real estate affiliates at inflated prices. See id.
98. See id. at 4 (citation omitted). CU also questioned whether the OCC had the
expertise to effectively regulate real estate activities. See id.
99. See id. at 5. Instead of operating subsidiaries, "affiliates" would provide a safer
means of conducting nonbank business because negative impacts of any subsidiary losses
would not be directly felt by the parent bank, CU argued. See id.
100. See, e.g., Letter from Steven A. Bennett, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Banc One Corporation, to the OCC (May 14, 1997) (on file with the OCC); Letter
from Robert R. Davis, Director of Government Relations, America's Community Bankers,
to the OCC (May 5, 1997) (on file with the OCC); Letter from Julius L. Loeser, Vice
President and Senior Counsel, Wells Fargo, to the OCC (Apr. 29, 1997) (on file with the
OCC); Letter from James D. McLaughlin, Director of Agency Relations, American Bankers
Association, to the OCC (May 5, 1997) (on file with the OCC); Letter from James C. Sivon,
Support Group for Modem Banking, to the OCC (May 23, 1997) (on file with the OCC).
101. See Letter from Robert R. Davis to the OCC, supra note 100, at 2.
102. See Letter from James C. Sivon to the OCC, supra note 100, at 2.
103. See Letter from Julius L. Loeser to the OCC, supra note 100, at 1-2.
104. A "nonoperating", or "net" lease is a lease in which the lessor of the property is not
obligated to provide any specialized services in connection with the lease, such as repairs,
maintenance, or insurance. See Leasing, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,554 (1996).
105. The "full-payout" requirement means that the bank must expect to recover the full
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basis for initial terms of at least ninety days. 6  Because the
estimated residual value of the leased property would not exceed
twenty-five percent of its acquisition cost, each lease would qualify
as a "full payout" lease functionally equivalent to a mortgage loan. 7
According to the application, the bank would acquire real property
only in connection with the proposed leasing transactions and would
not acquire real property in anticipation of leasing it at a later date.'08
NationsBank argued that RELF was "part of or incidental to
the business of banking" because the OCC had allowed national
banks to own real estate for the purpose of engaging in lease
financing transactions in other circumstances." 9 For example,
explained NationsBank, banks have been allowed to lease facilities
to municipalities, if the municipality agreed to acquire the facility at
the termination of the lease."' NationsBank also noted that the OCC
recently stated that in some cases it would permit a national bank to
costs of acquiring the property to be leased and must finance the leasing transactions from
sources that include rentals, estimated tax benefits, and the estimated residual value of the
property at the end of the lease. See id. These requirements are similar to the real estate
lease financing provisions for federal savings associations which require that leases be net,
full payout obligations. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.41(c) (1997).
106. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst, Associate General Counsel, NationsBank, to Mr.
Stephen J. Weiss, Deputy Controller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Mar. 26
1997) (on file with the OCC and also available on the internet at Proposals Out for
Comment (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/propregs.htm>); see also
Operating Subsidiary Notice 97-06, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,214 (1997). NationsBank patterned
the proposed leasing terms on the OCC's Part 23 rules. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to
Stephen J. Weiss, supra, at 1. These rules allow national banks to engage in personal
property lease financing transactions when the lease is the functional equivalent of a loan.
See Leasing, 61 Fed. Reg. at 66,554. Under this "functional equivalency" requirement, the
lease must be a "net," "full-payout" lease and any unguaranteed portion of the estimated
residual value of the leased property must not exceed 25% of the original cost of the
property. See id.
107. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 2.
108. See id. NationsBank would be the sole shareholder of the proposed subsidiary, and
would take measures to ensure compliance with the corporate and supervisory safeguards of
section 5.34(f). See id. at 2-4.
109. See id. at 4; see also Bank Powers, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1000 (1997). The OCC revised
the Part 7, Subpart A rules on February 9, 1996. See id.
110. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 4. Section
7.1000(d) of the new regulations provides:
A national bank may purchase or construct a municipal building, school
building, or other similar public facility and, as holder of legal title,
lease the facility to a municipality or other public authority having
resources sufficient to make all rental payments as they become due.
The lease agreement must provide that the lessee will become the owner
of the building or facility upon the expiration of the lease.
See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1000(d) (1997).
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acquire and lease real property where it is a component of a personal
property lease financing transaction."'
According to NationsBank, even if RELF is prohibited to
parent national banks based on the general prohibitions on real estate
ownership under section 29 of the National Bank Act, such
transactions should be allowed within operating subsidiaries." 2 The
bank asserted that allowing RELF would not frustrate the purposes
underlying the restrictions in section 29" 3 because long-term
financing agreements are more akin to lending money, which, under
section 37114 of the Federal Reserve Act, is a permissible activity for
banks."' Risk would be minimized because the investment would be
voluntarily limited to five percent of the bank's Tier 1 capital." 6
NationsBank would not accumulate large amounts of real estate, it
said, because the subsidiary would buy real estate only in connection
with proposed RELF transactions."7
The application regarding RELF received fewer comment
letters than the application to engage in real estate development."'
NAR took a more conciliatory tone than it did in response to
NationsBank's other application; the group recognized that
"NationsBank does have extensive experience in other aspects of
111. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 4-5 (citing
Leasing, 61 Fed. Reg. at 66,554 (revising rules governing personal property lease financing
transactions of national banks)).
112. See id. at 5. The bank analyzed the application of section 29 to RELF based on the
same criteria applied to the real estate development application. See id. at 6.
113. See supra note 68; see also infra note 148.
114. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). Section 371 allows a national bank to "make, arrange,
purchase, or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in real estate."
Id. § 371(a).
115. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 7. (citing
M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that personal property leases on a net full payout basis are the functional equivalent of
secured lending and therefore permissible for national banks)). The bank did not attempt to
argue that the activity was permissible under the National Bank Act, which permits banks to
"loan[] money on personal security." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
116. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Stephen J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 7.
117. See id.
118. The OCC received a total of 142 comment letters regarding the application, most
coming from the same realtors who opposed the application to develop real estate. See
OCC, Docket 97-06, NationsBank Operating Subsidiary Notice (1997) (on file with the
OCC). The OCC also received several letters from the same trade associations and banks
which expressed their support of the real estate development application. See id; see also
supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text. The application was not formally opposed by
Consumer's Union.
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leasing and lease financing.""' 9 In addition, the Federal Reserve did
not directly oppose the RELF application. 2  Banking trade
associations supported the application.12'
C. Zions Application - Municipal Revenue Bonds
The dust had barely settled before Zions First National Bank
(Zions)12 2 filed an application in April of 1997, requesting permission
to underwrite, deal in, and invest in municipal revenue bonds
(revenue bonds) through an operating subsidiary.12 1 The application
119. Letter from Stephen D. Driesler to the OCC, supra note 88, at 6. NAR also noted
that "[o]n the face [the application] is not an outrageous proposal" but urged "extreme
caution in evaluating the application." Id.
120. See Letter from William W. Wiles to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 84, at 3-4. The
letter observed that the activity "appeared to be permissible under the Bank Service
Company Act because real estate leasing activities have been found to be closely related to
banking." Id. Most likely, the Federal Reserve did not object to the RELF application
because that same activity is permissible for bank holding companies under its Regulation
Y issued in February of 1997. See infra notes 202, 260, 268 and accompanying text.
121. A letter from Support Group for Modem Banking argued the application should be
allowed because RELF is similar to activities currently permissible to federal savings
associations and bank holding companies. See Letter from James C. Sivon to the OCC,
supra note 100, at 3 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 560.41(b),(c) (1997) (federal savings associations)
and 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(3) (1997) (bank holding companies)). The ABA supported the
application. The ABA argued that a new lease agreement could be entered at the end of the
lease term if the lessee didn't own the property at the end of the lease, that the provisions of
the RELF agreement were consistent with those under Part 23 regarding leasing
transactions structured so as to be equivalent to a loan, and that the OCC had not yet
addressed whether RELF was permissible under the revised Part 7 rules. See Letter from
James D. McLaughlin, Director of Agency Relations, American Bankers Association, to the
OCC 2 (May 5, 1997) (on file with the OCC).
122. Zions First National Bank was chartered in 1873 and has its headquarters in Salt
Lake City, Utah. See Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1734 (Dec. 19, 1997). The bank
operates in the states of Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, California, and Idaho, and
currently has approximately $5 billion in assets. See id. The bank is one of the largest
dealers in U.S. securities between Chicago and California. See id. The OCC received only
twelve comment letters, primarily from municipalities, banks, and trade associations. See
OCC, Docket 97-10, First Zions Operating Subsidiary Notice (1997) (on file with the
OCC).
123. See Letter from W. David Hemingway, Executive Vice President, Zions First
National Bank, to the OCC (Apr. 8, 1997) (on file with the OCC); see also Operating
Subsidiary Notice 97-10, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,171, (1997), also available on the Internet at
Proposals Out for Comment (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http:/www.occ.treas.gov/
propregs.htm>. Banks are generally prohibited by the National Bank Act from
underwriting, dealing in, or investing in certain securities, including revenue bonds. See 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994). A provision was added to section 24 (Seventh) as a result of
Glass-Steagall to prevent the fusion of commercial and investment banking within the same
entity. See infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text. While section 24 (Seventh) does not
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proposed offering revenue bonds through an existing subsidiary
which was already providing brokerage and investment advisory
services. 2 Zions itself would offer the same services as proposed in
the application with respect to general obligation securities. 125 In
addition, the parent would continue to broker and provide investment
advice regarding securities such as revenue bonds to its institutional
customers, but the bank would fully disclose that it was acting only
as an agent and would advise that the revenue bonds were actually
being underwritten by the subsidiary. 2
6
On December 11, 1997, the OCC approved Zions'
application in a thirty-two page decision which announced that bank
operating subsidiaries may underwrite and deal in securities such as
revenue bonds, subject to the revenue limits for bank-ineligible
activities set forth by the Federal Reserve Board for member bank
affiliates under section 20 of Glass-Steagall.127 The OCC explained
allow banks to underwrite revenue bonds, it does authorize them to underwrite a host of
other types of investment securities, such as obligations of the United States, general
obligations of states and municipalities, and obligations issued under the authority of the
Federal Home Loan Bank, to a name a few. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh); see also infra
notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
124. See Letter from W. David Hemingway to the OCC, supra note 123, at 2. Zions was
already engaged in underwriting, dealing in, and investing in general obligation securities
which it marketed to institutional clients. See id. at 3. Under the terms of the proposal,
Zions said it would continue to underwrite and deal in general obligation bonds while the
subsidiary would provide similar services with respect to revenue bonds. See id.
125. See id. The primary difference between general obligation bonds and revenue
bonds is that the full faith, credit, and taxing power of municipalities back general
obligation bonds, while revenue bonds are only backed by the revenue stream from a
proposed municipal project. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, OCC Seen Giving Zions Unit
Authority on Revenue Bonds, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16, 1997, at 2.
126. See Letter from W. David Hemingway to the OCC, supra note 123, at 4.
127. See Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Zions First
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah to Commence New Activities in an Operating
Subsidiary, Conditional Approval No. 262, at 5 (Dec. 11, 1997) (on file with the OCC and
also available on the internet at Interpretations and Actions - Dec. 1997 (visited Mar. 4,
1998) <http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/interp/dec97/intdec97.htm>) [hereinafter Decision of the
Comptroller]. The opinion was written by OCC Chief Counsel Julie L. Williams. See id.
In a press release announcing OCC approval of the application, Chairman Ludwig stated
"what impressed me most [about the Zions application] were comments of officials from
the small towns of Utah who feel that their bond issues are too small to be of much interest
to Wall Street." See OCC Approves Zions Application to Underwrite Municipal Revenue
Bonds, NR 97-110 (Dec. 11, 1997) (on file with the OCC and available at OCC Approves
Zions Application to Underwrite Municipal Revenue Bonds (visited Mar. 4, 1998)
<http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/97-1 10.txt>). The press release also noted that
approval of the Zions application was more conservative than current financial
modernization legislation pending in the House Banking Committee which would permit
national bank subsidiaries to conduct underwriting of corporate debt and equity with fewer
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that although banks themselves are limited in their direct
involvement with securities by section 16 of Glass-Steagall, bank
"affiliates," such as nonbanking subsidiaries of bank holding
companies and operating subsidiaries of national banks, are subject
to the less severe restrictions of section 20.121 Under section 20 of
Glass-Steagall, an "affiliate" of a member bank may conduct
investment banking activities involving securities of all types,
including bank-ineligible securities, so long as it is not "engaged
principally" in underwriting and dealing in these bank-ineligible
securities, the OCC stated.'29 An operating subsidiary of a bank
qualifies as an affiliate because it is a company that is more than fifty
limitations than those imposed on the Zions subsidiary. See id. Because the decision was
authored by Williams, it is unclear whether Chairman Eugene A. Ludwig recused himself
from deciding the Zions application. Ludwig has currently recused himself from
consideration of the NationsBank applications in response to controversy stemming from
his meeting with Hugh McColl, NationsBank's Chief Executive Officer, at a White House
fund-raiser. See Atkins, supra note 8, at 690.
128. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 5. In its application, Zions
noted that the prohibitions on securities activities conducted directly by banks were
deliberately not applied to the subsidiaries, as evidenced by the fact that a different set of
rules (sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall) were applied to subsidiaries and affiliates of
national and state banks. See Memorandum in Support of the Application of Zions First
National Bank to Commence New Activities Through an Operating Subsidiary 14 (Apr. 8,
1997) (on file with the OCC and also available on the internet at Proposals Out for
Comment (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/propregs.htm>) [hereinafter
Zions Memorandum]. A district court decision supported the proposition that restrictions
applying to the banks themselves should not apply to subsidiaries, Zions argued. See id. at
16 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 683, 686
(D.D.C. 1985) (upholding an interpretation of Glass-Steagall by the FDIC that permitted
state banks to own affiliated subsidiaries engaged in the securities business)).
The application to engage in revenue bond activities was strongly opposed by the
Securities Industry Association (SIA). See Letter from Marc E. Lackritz, President, the
Securities Industry Association, to the OCC (May 19, 1997) (on file with the OCC)
[hereinafter SIA Memorandum]. SIA represents the interests of investment banks, broker
dealers, specialists, and mutual fund companies. See id. at I n.1. The SIA argued that
revenue bond activities were prohibited by Glass-Steagall, which was meant to separate
commercial and investment banking activities. See id. at 12-13 (citing Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Becker), 468 U.S. 137, 147 (1984)).
The SIA said it was irrelevant that the proposed activities would take place in a separate
operating subsidiary because of past OCC interpretations characterizing subsidiaries as
"departments" of the banks. See id. at 13-14. The SIA acknowledged, however, that there
was no legal precedent addressing whether the OCC may permit national banks to conduct
ineligible securities activities by means of an operating subsidiary. See id. at 16.
129. Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 5 (quoting Glass-Steagall). The
term "affiliate" is defined to include a corporation of which a bank directly or indirectly
owns or controls either a majority of the voting shares or more than 50% of the voting
shares. See 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (1994).
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percent owned or controlled by a bank, the OCC said.30 The OCC
further explained that because the Zions subsidiary had committed
itself to limiting revenues derived from underwriting and dealing in
revenue bonds to no more than twenty-five percent of its total
revenues, it would comply with the Federal Reserve's "Revenue
Test," which is used to determine if an affiliate is "principally
engaged" in securities activities under section 20.' Based on this
rationale, the OCC determined that since the Zions subsidiary would
not be "engaged principally" in selling bank ineligible securities, it
would not frustrate the purposes of Glass-Steagall to conduct the
activity in a bank operating subsidiary.'
The OCC further ruled that underwriting and dealing in
revenue bonds is within a national bank's express statutory authority
to "discount and negotiate evidences of debt."'33 According to the
OCC's decision, "evidence of debt" includes a debt security such as a
revenue bond, and the terms "to discount and negotiate" include the
power to buy and sell as principal.1
34
The OCC emphasized that Zions' involvement in municipal
revenue bonds would entail little added risk for the bank but would
provide substantial benefits for both banks and municipalities. 3 ' The
OCC noted that banks have significant experience investing in and
analyzing revenue bonds and other securities.'36 Furthermore,
130. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 19. Under Rule 5.34,
"operating subsidiaries" include entities in which the parent bank "owns more than 50% of
the voting (or similar type of controlling) interest of the subsidiary; or the parent otherwise
controls the subsidiary and no other party controls more than 50% of the voting (or similar
type of controlling) interest of the subsidiary." 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) (1997).
131. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 19. Under the Revenue Test, if
an affiliate earns 25% or less of its revenue from underwriting and dealing in securities
ineligible to a bank, it is not "engaged principally" in that activity for purposes of section
20. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding
Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities (Regulation Y), 61 Fed.
Reg. 68,750, 68,750-52 (1996).
132. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 19.
133. Id. at 8 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994)). Zions argued that the
underwriting of municipal bonds was a permissible activity because it qualified as
incidental to the business of banking as defined in VALIC. See Zions Memorandum, supra
note 128, at 2 (citing NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258-60 (1995)).
134. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 9.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 10.
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explained the OCC, the risks presented by underwriting and dealing
in municipal revenue bonds are not a new risk because banks are
already authorized under section 16 of Glass-Steagall to issue other
types of revenue bonds, such as housing, university, or dormitory
bonds.' 3 The OCC also said that allowing Zions to underwrite and
deal in revenue bonds would benefit municipalities by providing
greater access to funds and would benefit the bank by allowing it to
diversify its activities and generate new sources of income. 3 '
The OCC stated that its oversight of Zions would ensure the
"safe and sound operation" of the bank and would guarantee that
Zions complies with all applicable regulatory and supervisory
restrictions.'39 Furthermore, explained the OCC, the Zions subsidiary
would be subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the subsidiary would therefore have to comply with
numerous financial reporting, anti-fraud, and financial responsibility
rules. 40 In addition, the OCC noted that the subsidiary would also be
137. See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994)). The OCC also observed that the
Federal Reserve has determined that the underwriting and dealing in municipal revenue
bonds is a "natural extension of activities currently conducted by banks, involving little
additional risk . . . and potentially yielding significant public benefits in the form of
increased competition and convenience at lower cost." Id. at I I n.23 (quoting Citicorp, J.P.
Morgan & Co. and Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 487 (1987), affd sub
nom, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1988)).
138. See id. at 12. Zions noted in its memorandum that there had been a significant
decrease in investment banks offering municipal financing services, and argued that the lack
of competition had resulted in higher interest charges being paid by municipalities. See
Zions Memorandum, supra note 128, at 10. The bank explained that a congressional study
found in 1988 that permitting banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds could have
saved state and local governments as much as $480 million per year. See id. (citing Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S.
REP. No. 100-15 (1988)). The bank argued that additional competition was needed since
several brokerage firms, such as CS First Boston; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette; Lazard
Freres and Chemical Securities had eliminated their municipal finance businesses since
1995. See id. at 19. As a result, the bank argued, smaller communities were less able to
obtain financing because brokerage firms were unwilling to underwrite or deal the relatively
small amount of securities these municipalities wished to offer. See id.
139. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 26-27. The OCC added that it
has a great deal of experience overseeing banks which participate in the underwriting,
dealing, and investing in government securities. See id. at 27.
140. See id. When the OCC originally proposed revising the operating subsidiary rule,
it received a letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requesting
confirmation that if the regulations were approved: "(1) securities activities conducted in
operating subsidiaries would be subject to federal securities laws, and (2) the OCC's
regulation would not allow activities previously not permitted for a bank itself to be shifted
from an operating subsidiary to the bank." Id. at 27 n.73 (citing Rules, Policies, and
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subject to the rules and regulations of the National Association of
Securities Dealers and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
each of which would serve as additional safeguards against financial
losses. 1'
IV. ANALYSIS
This section evaluates each of the applications based on the
three primary criteria 42 which the OCC has stated it will consider in
approving the applications, focusing primarily on the rationale
underlying the restriction on the parent bank.143  First, this section
analyzes the restrictions section 29 of the National Bank Act imposes
on a national bank's ability to engage in real estate activities as
proposed by NationsBank, and discusses possible arguments for why
these restrictions should be given less weight, especially when
applied to a bank subsidiary. 44 It then analyzes the OCC's rationale
for approving Zions' application and considers the arguments that
commercial and investment banking should be completely separated
under section 16 of Glass-Steagall.145
A. NationsBank Application - Real Estate Development
NationsBank applied to engage in real estate development
activities through an operating subsidiary.146 The restrictions on such
activities by a parent bank are found in section 29 of the National
Bank Act, which specifically declares that a bank may "purchase,
hold, and convey" real estate in four particular circumstances and
"no others."'47 One circumstance in which a bank may purchase real
Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,351 n.1 (1996)). The OCC
noted in its decision that the Zions subsidiary would indeed be required to comply with
federal securities laws and that the SEC could examine and potentially discipline Zions for
any violations stemming from the subsidiary's revenue bond activities. See id. at 27 n.74.
141. See id. at 27.
142. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 146-252 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 146-212 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 213-52 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
147. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1994). NationsBank noted that "there is no counterpart to section
29 that applies to the activities of a bank holding company or its nonbank subsidiaries."
Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 7.
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estate is when it "shall be necessary for its accommodation in the
transaction of its business," as in the case of bank premises.4 OCC
regulations provide limitations on the amount which a bank may
invest in bank premises.149 Because the limitations in section 29 and
accompanying OCC regulations are rather specific, the purpose
underlying the restriction is important. 5 ' According to the Supreme
Court in National Bank v. Matthews,' the underlying purposes for
the section 29 restrictions are threefold: (a) to allow the banks to
provide a steady flow of capital, (b) to deter them from engaging in
the hazards of real estate investment, and (c) to prevent the
accumulation of large amounts of real estate.1
2
The NationsBank application raises concerns about providing
a steady flow of capital to bank customers, as well as a larger
concern over whether banks might be led to compete with their
customers over real estate development projects. NationsBank
attempts to address the flow of capital concern by including a self-
148. 12 U.S.C. § 29. OCC regulations define real estate permissible for the "transaction
of its business" to include:
(i) Premises that are owned and occupied (or to be occupied, if under
construction) by the bank, its branches, or its consolidated subsidiaries;
(ii) Real estate acquired and intended, in good faith, for use in future
expansion;
(iii) Parking facilities that are used by customers or employees of the
bank, its branches, and its consolidated subsidiaries; and
(iv) Residential property for the use of bank officers or employees [in
remote areas or foreign countries].
12 C.F.R. § 7.1000(a)(I)-(2) (1997).
149. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1000(c)(1)-(2). Specifically, the regulations provide that 12
U.S.C. § 371d governs when OCC approval is required for a national bank to invest in bank
premises. See id. § 7.1000(c)(1). Section 371d states that a bank may not invest in bank
premises unless either the bank receives prior approval by the Comptroller of the Currency,
the aggregate amount of all investments and loans for bank premises is less than or equal to
the amount of the capital stock of the bank, or the aggregate of investments and loans is less
than or equal to 150% of the capital of the bank and the bank meets certain CAMEL,
capitalization, and notification requirements. See 12 U.S.C. § 371d(a)(l)-(3) (1994).
150. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
151. 98 U.S. 621 (1878).
152. See id. at 626. Other courts have also construed the reasoning behind the
prohibitions imposed by section 29. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. Fleetwood Realty
Corp., 441 N.E.2d 1244 (Iil. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that the purpose is "to protect bank
depositors and stockholders from risky investments"); Exchange Bank of Commerce v.
Meadors, 184 P.2d 458, 463 (Okla. 1947) (stating that purpose is to prevent speculation in
real estate). For further discussion of the history of the restrictions on banks owning real
estate, see John A. DeAngelis, Note, Riches Do Not Last Forever: Real Estate Investment
by National Banks, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 777, 779-84.
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imposed limitation on its investment in real estate development
activities to two percent of Tier 1 capital.'53 In addition, the bank
said it would sell any real estate which it develops as quickly as
possible."4 However, some commenters expressed fear that bank
participation in real estate development would affect banks' lending
judgment with respect to real estate development projects. 55 These
commenters noted that there might be inadequate firewalls to prevent
banks from forwarding insider information regarding promising real
estate to its real estate development subsidiaries and that banks might
be tempted to compete with customers on real estate projects.'56
NationsBank answered these concerns by promising that all contracts
between the parent and subsidiary would be on terms and conditions
"substantially comparable" to those with outside parties.'57 Because
it would apply sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act,
NationsBank argued, all deals would be conducted at arms length.5 8
Perhaps the greatest concern surrounding the proposed
activity is that banks might engage in "hazardous real estate
speculation." The Federal Reserve noted that "the nation's recent
experience with allowing federally insured thrifts to engage in real
estate development through subsidiaries serves to confirm the
imprudence of mixing banking and real estate. '59 NationsBank
argued that the Tier 1 limitation of two percent adequately addressed
concerns that it might be exposing too many assets to real estate
development. 6 The bank also stated that the risks would be
mitigated by its plans to become well-capitalized or to terminate the
real estate activities if the bank fails to be well-capitalized for two
153. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 7.
154. See id. at 8.
155. See, e.g., Letter from Kent W. Colton to the OCC, supra note 96, at 4.
156. See id.
157. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 3.
158. See id. For a description of sections 23A and 23B, see supra notes 35-36.
159. Letter from William W. Wiles to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 84, at 1. The Federal
Reserve also argued that banks might end up devoting a greater percentage of their
resources to real estate activities, thereby exposing them to greater potential losses. See id.
at 2.
160. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 8. The bank
also said it would deduct its equity investment in the subsidiary from its capital and total
assets which would reduce risk by requiring the bank to maintain minimum capital
requirements without including the subsidiaries capital. See id. This falls within one of the
supervisory requirements of the new Part 5 rules. See 12 C.F.RI § 5.34(f)(3)(i) (1997).
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successive quarters."' While critics point to the losses suffered by
the S&Ls during the 1980s as a result of their real estate investments,
the limitations proposed by NationsBank are consistent with similar
protections under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act.6 2
That act allows an insured state bank to invest in a "qualified housing
project" up to two percent of the total assets of the bank.' 63 A
"qualified housing project" is defined as "residential real estate that
is intended to primarily benefit lower income people throughout the
period of the investment.', 164
NationsBank's argument assumes that real estate risks will be
limited by its plans to divest itself of any unprofitable real estate and
by limitations imposed on the parent's investment in the subsidiary.
The Federal Reserve pointed out the flaws in this assumption by
noting the difficulty of recognizing "bad real estate investments"
because of the "cyclical and speculative nature of real estate.' ' 65 The
NAR also noted that banks and thrifts traditionally have not
performed well in the real estate arena when they venture beyond
lending. 166  While NationsBank argued that it had "substantial
experience in developing both commercial and residential real
161. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 8.
162. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994). That Act prohibits state banks from engaging as a
principal in "any type of activity that is not permissible for a national bank." Id. §
183 1a(a)(1). However, the act provides exceptions if the FDIC determines both that the
activity "pose[s] no significant risk to the appropriate deposit insurance fund" and that the
state bank continues to meet capital requirements. 1d.
163. See id. § 183 1a(c)(3)(B).
164. See id. § 183la(c)(3)(C)(i). For information on newly-proposed FDIC rules, see
infra note 185.
165. Letter from William W. Wiles to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 84, at 2. They argued
that NationsBank's plans to divest of poor real estate investments were overly optimistic
because investors rarely know when they are making "bad real estate investments." Id. The
FDIC echoed this concern, stating that real estate investment activity is risky partly because
of a long gestation period for projects, resulting in changed supply and demand conditions
when the projects finally come to market. See Letter from Ricki Heifer to Eugene Ludwig,
supra note 87, at 2.
166. See Letter from Steven D. Driesler to the OCC, supra note 88, at 3 (citing Ricki
Heifer, Testimony of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Financial
Modernization, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises 2-5 (Mar. 5, 1997)). See
generally JONATHAN BROWN, SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE (1991) (concluding
that S&Ls engaged in real estate activities had a higher incidence of failure than those
without such investments); EDWARD J. KAN, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS (1989) (arguing
the S&L crisis derived from expansion into real estate ventures).
290 [Vol. 2
NONBANK SUBSIDJARYACTIVITIES
estate,"'67 Consumer's Union distinguished banks' experience in
financing from their experience in development.'68 While financing
consists of the extension of credit, CU explained, development
includes planning and construction. 6 9
Another assumption underlying NationsBank's argument is
that certain steps taken by the bank will minimize losses which might
result from bad real estate investments. NationsBank argued that the
two percent investment limitation and deduction of the equity
investment from the parent's capital and total assets would restrict
any potential losses to a de minimis amount.' In comparison, state
banks may invest up to two percent of their total assets in qualified
housing projects." 1 In addition, federal savings associations are
permitted to invest, through service corporations,"' up to three
percent of their assets in real estate activities."'
Although the NationsBank application seems to fall within
the percentage limitations of these parallel regulations, the proposed
development is slightly different from that which is allowed by the
167. Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 8. The bank
argued that commercial and residential real estate development bore similar risks to those
involved in developing, purchasing, and selling bank premises. See id. at 6. For example,
NationsBank often develops property for bank premises and then only occupies a portion of
the property while leasing or selling the remainder. See id. The bank also argued that it is
exposed to similar risks when it make real estate secured loans. See id.
168. See Letter from Mary Griffin to the OCC, supra note 92, at 3 (noting that financing
involves the extension of credit, a banking activity, while development involves the end-use
of credit, which is a function of commerce). The FDIC pointed out other differences in
development when compared to financing: variability or uncertainty of returns on invested
funds as compared with other equity investments, lack of security, inadequate financial
information, illiquid markets, and the highly leveraged character of most commercial real
estate investments. See Letter from Ricki Heifer to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 87, at 2.
169. See Letter from Mary Griffin to the OCC, supra note 92, at 3.
170. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 8.
171. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
172. A "service corporation" is a corporation organized under the laws of the state in
which the federal savings association's home office is located and whose entire capital
stock is available for purchase only by savings associations of that state and by federal
associations having their home offices in that state. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(4)(B) (1994).
Under the regulations, a service corporation may acquire real estate for development, rental,
resale, remodeling, renovation, offices, management activities, or real estate brokerage. See
12 C.F.R. § 559.4(e) (1997).
173. See 12 C.F.R. § 559.5(a). Investments must "serve primarily community, inner
city, or community development purposes." Id, § 559.5(a). The regulations on state banks
seem to allow additional investment if an activity poses no significant risk to deposit
insurance funds and the state bank has complied with applicable credit standards. See 12
U.S.C. § 1831a(l)(A)-(B).
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other regulations. As earlier noted, the application proposes to
develop forty-five residential condominiums at a cost of $13
million. 4  Assuming the units were sold at cost, each unit would
retail for approximately $300,000 and would not qualify as a
"qualified housing project" '  under the regulations applicable to
state banks. Furthermore, when the real estate development is
combined with the proposed RELF activities, 76 NationsBank could
have up to seven percent of its Tier 1 capital committed to real
estate-related projects. This amount might be considered risky.
In response to the concern in Matthews that banks would
accumulate large amounts of real estate, NationsBank argued that its
de minimis investment amounts combined with its plans to quickly
sell any developed real estate would help to prevent such
accumulations.7 7 The OCC must consider, however, that banks have
already poked several holes in section 29 through extensive
development of bank premises under the statutory phrase of
"necessary for its accommodation in the transaction of its
business.17 8  While an investment of two percent might seem
insignificant, the amount could be substantial for a bank the size of
NationsBank, whose consolidated balance sheet for the year ended
December 31, 1997, shows $3.2 billion in "premises and
equipment." 179
An additional risk not contemplated in the Matthews decision
is the potential for real estate losses to translate into losses to the
federal deposit insurance fund which did not exist in 1878 when the
case was decided.8 In response to the application, the FDIC
174. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 2.
175. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. While the term "lower income
people" is not defined in the statute, given their high price, the term probably would not
include purchasers of the condominiums.
176. According to NationsBank, the RELF activities would be capped at five percent.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
177. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 8-9.
178. 12 U.S.C. § 29(First) (1994). As noted by NationsBank in its application, the real
estate projects proposed by the subsidiary would be "a fraction of the real estate currently
owned and occupied by NationsBank as premises." Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven
J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 8.
179. See NATIONSBANK CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
180. Federal Deposit Insurance was created under the Banking Act of 1933 in response
to the bank panic of 1933 and is available to qualifying members of the Federal Reserve
System. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND
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cautioned that any real estate investment activity should be
approached cautiously and with limitations to "protect the banks and
the deposit insurance funds from losses."'" The FDIC argued that
such activities should be permitted only "where there is a clear legal
separation from the insured bank, stringent firewalls and limited
exposure of the capital of the consolidated organization."' 8 2
Although the FDIC responded to the application with some concern,
the FDIC apparently determined that real estate development may be
permissible given certain safeguards.18 3  However, allowing real
estate development by national bank subsidiaries would likely mean
184 tathat state-chartered banks could engage in such activity. In that
case, the risk that the federal deposit insurance fund could suffer
losses would increase.185
REGULATION 21-22 (2d ed. 1997). The insurance is administered by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), an independent agency which is overseen by a five-person
board of directors. See id. at 67. The FDIC provides federal deposit insurance to all
national banks and most state-chartered banks. See id.
181. Letter from Ricki Heifer to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 87, at 1. The Federal
Reserve claimed that bank subsidiaries have a competitive advantage over companies not
owned by a bank because federal deposit insurance acts as a subsidy, reducing the cost of
capital to the subsidiaries. See Pamela Atkins, New Bank Businesses Should be in Holding
Company, Greenspan Insists, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 348 (Feb. 24, 1997). In response,
the OCC claimed that no evidence exists of banks acting as though there is such a subsidy,
or of banks favoring one type of organizational structure over another. See id.
182. Letter from Ricki Heifer to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 87, at 3.
183. See id. ("It is my view that real estate development activities . . . should be
permitted for bank subsidiaries only where there is a clear legal separation from the insured
bank, stringent firewalls and limited exposure of the capital of the consolidated
organization.").
184. 12 U.S.C. § 183la(c)(1) (1994).
185. The CU feared that allowing the national bank subsidiaries to engage in real estate
development might be used to support the same activities by state banks. See Letter from
Mary Griffin to the OCC, supra note 92, at 3. Oddly enough, that is exactly what the FDIC
has proposed, issuing a proposed rule on August 26, 1997 which would make it easier for
healthy state-chartered banks to engage in real estate and securities activities. See FDIC
Issues Proposal Easing Requirements for Real Estate Investment by State Banks, 69
Banking Rep. (BNA) 347-48 (Sept. 8, 1997). The proposed rule gives state banks the
authority to engage in real estate activities through a majority-owned subsidiary. See
Activities of Insured State Banks and Insured Savings Associations, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,969,
48,016 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 362). The proposed rule would allow banks
with investments exceeding two percent of their Tier I capital to engage in real estate
activities, so long as certain safeguards are satisfied. See id. at 48,017 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 362.4(b)(5)(i)). If a bank's investment in the subsidiary does not exceed two
percent of its Tier I capital, it would not be subject to these restrictions. See id.
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B. NationsBank Application - Real Estate Lease Financing
NationsBank's application to engage in RELF falls within an
area in which the OCC has been more permissive, indicating that
subsidiaries may conduct certain leasing activities subject to the
agency's review." 6 In its application to engage in the RELF
activities, NationsBank proposed limitations on leases which seem
designed to comply with prior precedent from the OCC and the
courts.117 The proposed leases would be restricted to "nonoperating,"
"full payout" leases, for initial terms of at least ninety days.'88
Because the leases will involve real estate, and not personal property,
the relevant section appears to be section 29 of the National Bank
Act. 8 9
Whether section 29 is applicable is somewhat unclear because
the terms of the lease have several characteristics of a financing
transaction. In M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Natl. Bank,90
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
distinguished leasing from financing, holding that "in light of all the
relevant circumstances," certain leasing of motor vehicles constitutes
a loan of money secured by vehicles and is allowable as part of the
"business of banking."' 9' The court emphasized that the lessor bank
must look primarily to the creditworthiness of the lessee and not to
the market value of the leased property. 92 In contrast, the court
noted that a loan which must be repeated or extended in order for the
186. See NationsBank Tests OCC with First Applications Under New Op-Sub Rule,
BANKING POL'Y REP., Apr. 21, 1997, at 11, available in WESTLAW, Bnkpr Library.
187. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 1.
188. See id. at 1-2. The definitions and significance of these restrictions are discussed
supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
189. See 12 U.S.C. §29 (1994). Banks are allowed to lease personal property under
section 24 (Seventh), which allows banks to loan money "on personal security." Id. § 24
(Seventh). Banks are also authorized to "invest in tangible personal property, including
without limitation, vehicles, manufactured homes, machinery, equipment, or furniture, for
lease financing transactions on a net lease basis, but such investment may not exceed 10
percent of the assets of the association." Id. § 24 (Tenth).
190. 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977).
191. Id. at 1380. The court noted, however, that a lease ceases to be a secured loan
when the lessor bank assumes material burdens other than those of a lender which subjects
it to risks not ordinarily incident to a secured loan. See id. The court determined that banks
may use "new ways of conducting the very old business of banking." Id. at 1382.
192. See id. at 1383-84.
294 [Vol. 2
NONBANK SUBSIDIARYACTIVITIES
bank to recover its advances and profits was akin to a rental business
and would not qualify as a loan.' 9  Although perhaps useful by
analogy, the rationale of M&M Leasing has to date only been applied
by the courts to personal property.1 94
The OCC, meanwhile, has announced its position that certain
real property leases may be offered by banks.195 While not expressly
authorized by section 29 of the National Bank Act, the OCC has
allowed lease financing of public facilities to municipalities or public
authorities having sufficient resources to make all payments, if the
lease agreement requires that the lessee become the owner at the
expiration of the lease.' 96 The OCC has also stated that under certain
circumstances real estate leasing may be an incidental component of
a personal property leasing transaction. 197 Although the OCC has not
previously allowed RELF transactions, NationsBank argued that in
creating these two exceptions, the OCC recognized that RELF is the
functional equivalent of lending and qualifies as an activity
"incidental" to banking under section 24 (Seventh).198
The NationsBank application includes several restrictive
provisions on its proposed RELF transactions in a clear effort to
make the transactions mirror a loan of money secured by property. 199
193. See id. at 1384.
194. Search of WESTLAW; Allfeds Library (Mar. 1, 1998) (search for records
containing "M&M Leasing" and "real property" or "real estate").
195. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1000 (1997). Under Subpart A of Part 7 enumerating bank
powers, banks may purchase certain public facilities to lease with some restrictions. See id.
§ 7.1000(d)(1). The Part 7 regulations were revised in 1996. See Interpretive Rulings, 61
Fed. Reg. 4849 (1996). The OCC refused to expand section 7.1000, which permits banks
to purchase and then lease certain public facilities, to allow leases to non-public entities; the
OCC said it would "not address this issue at this time." Id.
196. See 12 C.F.R § 7.1000(d)(1); see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
197. See Leasing, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,654 (1996). The OCC said'it would decide, on a
case-by-case basis, the permissibility based upon the facts of a given lease financing
transaction. See id. at 66,656. The OCC regulations provide that a bank may "acquire
personal property for the purpose of, or in connection with leasing that property, and may
engage in activities incidental thereto, if the lease qualifies as a full-payout lease and a net
lease." 12 C.F.R. § 23.3 (1997).
198. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 5. The bank
argued that because long-term RELF is the functional equivalent of real estate lending, it is
an activity permissible for a national bank and its operating subsidiary. See id. at 7. A
national bank may "make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by
liens on interests in real estate" as the OCC prescribes by regulation or order. 12 U.S.C. §
371 (1994).
199. See M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.
1977).
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Regulations issued by the OCC allow a bank to lease personal
property if the lease "qualifies as a full-payout lease and a net
lease."200 Because NationsBank said it would only offer leases on a
"nonoperating" (i.e. a "net lease") and "full payout" basis20' and that
any estimated residual value of the leased property would not exceed
twenty-five percent of the acquisition cost, the proposed activity
seems to fall within the criteria specified by the OCC for other types
of acceptable leases.20 2
If the OCC determines that RELF is already permissible for
the parent bank as an activity "incidental" to the "business of
banking" because of its similarity to loans, RELF is clearly
permissible in operating subsidiaries. Although the OCC has yet to
determine that the leasing of real estate to non-public entities is a
permitted activity under Part 7 and 23 of the regulations,2 3 the
NationsBank application gives the OCC an opportunity to finally
resolve the issue.
If the OCC determines that section 29 is in fact applicable to
RELF, the OCC would again look to Matthews to determine the
200. 12 C.F.R. § 23.3(a) (1997); supra notes 104-05. Similar restrictions apply to
federal savings associations, which are permitted to become the "legal or beneficial owner
of tangible personal property or real property for the purpose of leasing such property." 12
C.F.R. § 560.41(a). To qualify as the functional equivalent of a loan, the lease by the
federal savings associations must be a "net, full payout lease representing a non-cancelable
obligation of the lessee." Id § 560.41(c)(2).
201. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 1. The
application states that it expects the leases will yield a return that will compensate the
subsidiary an amount at least as much as the subsidiary's full investment in the real
property plus the estimated total cost of financing the property over the term of the lease
from rental payments, estimated tax benefits, and the estimated residual value of the
property at the expiration of the initial term. See id. at 2.
202. See id. The 25% residual value requirement follows the requirement for personal
leases which mandates that "any unguaranteed amount must not exceed 25% of the original
cost of the property to the bank." 12 C.F.R § 23.21(a)(2). The limitations also follow those
imposed by the Federal Reserve on nonbanks under its new Regulation Y provisions
relating to real estate leasing regulations. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in
Bank Control (Regulation Y), 62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
225). The new Part Y regulations permit the leasing of real and personal property. See id.
at 9335. For personal property leases, the lease must be on a nonoperating basis for an
initial term of at least 90 days. See id. For real estate leases, there are the additional
requirements that the lessor recover at least its full investment in the property and that the
estimated residual value of the property not exceed 25% of the lessor's acquisition cost.
See id.
203. See supra note 196-98 and accompanying text.
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purpose of the restrictions.2 4  As discussed earlier, the Supreme
Court announced that the purpose of section 29 is to allow banks to
provide a steady flow of capital, to deter them from engaging in the
dangers of real estate investment, and to prevent them from
accumulating large amounts of real estate.2 °5
In its application, NationsBank gave reasons why allowing
RELF in the bank's operating subsidiary would not undermine the
underlying purposes of section 29. Regarding the "flow of capital,"
NationsBank noted that it would voluntarily limit its interest in real
estate transactions to five percent of the parent's Tier 1 capital.0 6
The five percent limitation would also act as a safeguard against
"hazardous real estate speculation" by preventing the bank from
exposing itself to excessive risk.20 7 In addition, the "full payout"
requirements and the twenty-five percent limit on the residual value
at the end of the lease term would limit potential losses upon the
termination or expiration of a lease.20 8 Accumulation of excess real
estate would not be a problem because the bank would only acquire
property in connection with a proposed RELF transaction.2 9 If the
lessee did not acquire the property at the termination of the lease, the
subsidiary would either enter into a new lease agreement with the
lessee or a third party, or reclassify the property as "other real estate
owned"210 and dispose of the property in accordance with the OCC
guidelines.2
204. See 98 U.S. 621 (1878); see also supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
205. See Matthews, 98 U.S. at 626.
206. See Letter from Gerald P. Hurst to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 106, at 7.
207. See id. at 8.
208. See id.
209. See id. The bank noted that the subsidiary would own only legal title, while the
lessee would have all possessory rights to the property. See id.
210. "Other Real Estate Owned" (OREO) generally consists of all real estate a national
bank acquires which is not currently in use or contemplated for use within the near future as
bank premises. See Other Real Estate Owned, 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.81-34.87 (1997). Banks are
permitted to own OREO by virtue of section 29 of the National Bank Act, which provides
that banks may own real estate under mortgage or to secure debts due to it for up to five
years. See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1994). Banks may own real estate for up to an additional five
years if it has made a good faith attempt to liquidate the OREO within the initial five-year
period or if disposal of the property within the five-year period would be harmful to the
organization. See id.
211. See 12 U.S.C. §29.
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While the OCC has previously allowed RELF only with
respect to municipal facilities,2 it has never ruled out the possibility
that it might allow similar transactions with private entities. Whether
the OCC ultimately approves the application will depend, in part,
upon whether it determines that the five percent limitation provides
adequate protection against losses from real estate investment. It is
unclear whether the OCC will consider the two applications in the
aggregate, which together could potentially result in up to seven
percent of the bank's capital being devoted to real estate-type
activities.
C. Zions Application - Municipal Revenue Bonds
Downplaying the possibility that section 16 of Glass-
Steagal 2"3 might prohibit national banks from underwriting and
dealing in municipal revenue bonds, the OCC approved the Zions
application by determining that the activity was allowed under the
express powers language of section 24 (Seventh) of the National
Bank Act, which authorizes national banks to "discount and
negotiate evidences of debt., 214 The OCC determined that the term
"evidence of debt" includes a debt security such as a revenue bond
and that the phrase "to negotiate and discount" includes the power to
buy and sell bonds as principal.2t5
212. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
213. See supra 'note 53. For a more through discussion regarding the controversy
surrounding Glass-Steagall and its historical underpinnings, see generally Robert M.
Kurucza, et al., Securities and Investment Activities of Banks, 43 Bus. LAW. 1107 (1988);
Michael S. Raab, The Transparency Theory: An Alternative Approach to Glass-Steagall
Issues, 97 YALE L.J. 603 (1988); Curtis J. Polk, The Glass-Steagall Act-Has it Outlived its
Usefulness?, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1987).
214. Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 6 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh) (1994)). Section 24 (Seventh) was passed in 1863 as part of the National Bank
Act. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 180, at 11. Glass-Steagall, otherwise known as the
Banking Act of 1933, was passed as part of major banking reform in response to bank
panics in 1933 which ultimately resulted in President Franklin D. Roosevelt declaring a
nationwide banking holiday on March 6, 1933. See id. at 21-22. In addition to separating
commercial and investment banking, Glass-Steagall also established a program of federal
deposit insurance. See id. at 22-23.
215. Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 9 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh). Citing a decision of the Supreme Court in 1881, the OCC determined that the
term "discount" includes the purchases of notes and other evidences of debt. See id. (citing
National Bank v. Johnson, 104 U.S. 271 (1881)). The OCC also said that a "negotiation"
includes a transfer, disposition, or sale. See id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (5th
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Despite its broad interpretation of the terms of section 24
(Seventh), the OCC interpreted the prohibitions of Glass-Steagall
narrowly, stating that the Act prohibited only "certain types of
securities" from being sold directly by a bank and did not entirely
exclude investment banking from the business of banking.216 The
OCC pointed to section 24 (Seventh) as the legal basis which
allowed banks to engage in investment banking activities before the
passage of Glass-Steagall.217 The effect of that act, according to the
OCC, was to keep banks from engaging in investment activities with
respect to "certain types of securities;" the act did not, however, alter
"the basic concept of the business of banking," including banks'
ability "to discount and negotiate promissory notes and other
evidences of debt."2 8 Thus, explained the OCC, banks are allowed
to continue these activities, to a limited extent, through a subsidiary
or other bank-related entity.21
Though the OCC interpreted Glass-Steagall as allowing
banks to engage in investment banking activities in some
circumstances, the Supreme Court has generally expressed in dicta a
disdain for mixing commercial and investment banking. In
Investment Company Institute v. Camp,220 the Court held that banks
ed. 1979); 28 WoRDs AND PHRASES 768-72 (West 1955 & Supp. 1997)).
216. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 6. In fact, said the OCC, the
Act expressly recognized investment banking as a part of the business of banking. See id.
Support for the OCC's position that the restrictions apply only to "certain types of
securities" is found in other portions of section 24 (Seventh). Specifically, section 24
(Seventh) allows banks to sell certain types of securities, providing that "the limitations and
restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting and purchasing for its own
account, investment securities shall not apply" to obligations of the United States, general
obligations of states and their political subdivisions, and other agencies of the federal
government. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
217. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 9. The OCC also cited
historical precedent to support its position, stating that underwriting and dealing was
already a part of the business of banking at the time the national banking system was
created by President Abraham Lincoln. See id. at 6. When the National Bank Act was
enacted in 1863 (originally named the National Currency Act), banks entered' investment
banking by selling war bonds for the Civil War and continued to buy and sell government
securities after 1865, the OCC said. See id. at 7. In addition, the OCC cited the House
Report on the McFadden Act limiting banks' investment banking activities which stated, "it
is a matter of common knowledge that national banks have been engaged in the investment
securities business ... for a number of years." See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 69-83, at 2
(1926); CoNG. REc. 2828 (1926)).
218. Id. at 9.
219. See id.
220. 401 U.S. 617 (1970).
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may not participate in mutual investment funds because they are
securities and thus cannot be underwritten by banks without violating
Glass-Steagall sections 16 and 21.221 The case involved OCC
regulations that authorized banks to establish and operate collective
investment funds.222 The Court explained that Congress, in passing
Glass-Steagall, intended to enact a strict separation between
commercial and investment banking, in order to prevent the conflicts
of interest banks might experience if they had both promotional and
pecuniary interests in particular investment opportunities.223 The
Court stated that "[e]ven before the passage of the [Glass-Steagall]
Act, it was generally believed that it was improper for a commercial
bank to engage in investment banking directly. 224 Although banks
had attempted to circumvent the prohibitions in Glass-Steagall by
establishing securities affiliates, the Court observed in dicta that
Glass-Steagall "confirmed that national banks could not engage in
221. See id. at 639.
222. See id. at 619 (citing 12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (1970)). The plan operated by having a bank
customer tender between $10,000 to $500,000 to the bank with an authorization which
made the bank the customer's managing agent. See id. The investment was added to the
fund, and the bank issued a written evidence of participation, which represented the
customer's proportionate interest in fund assets. See id. The actual custody and investment
of the fund assets was handled by the bank in its role as an investment advisor pursuant to a
management agreement. See id. at 623.
223. See id. at 629. The Supreme Court determined that Glass-Steagall responded to
concerns by Congress that banks had been hurt by stock market declines stemming from
their "direct and indirect involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative
securities." Id. at 630 (citing S. REP. No. 73-77, at 6, 8, 10). Congress was concerned that
public confidence in banks might decline if banks experienced losses through their
securities practices. See id. at 631. In addition, Congress worried that banks might make
unsound loans to its securities affiliates to compensate for these losses. See id. (citing
Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 before a Subcommittee on the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 20, 237, 1063 (1931)) [hereinafter 1931
Hearings]. The Court also cited to congressional fears that bank customers might suffer
losses on investments they purchased due to their trust in the bank. See id. (citing 77 CONG.
REC. 4028 (remarks of Rep. Fish).
The Supreme Court expressed concern over whether securities activities by banks
might affect their judgment. The Court determined that Glass-Steagall reflected Congress'
concern that banks might make unsound loans to companies in whose stock or securities the
securities affiliate had invested. See id. (citing 1931 Hearings, supra, at 1064). The Court
also stated that the banks would be unable to make disinterested investment advice to
customers where they had a "promotional interest" as an investment banker. See id. at 633.
224. Id. at 629 (citing 1931 Hearings, supra note 223, at 40; 1920 Report of the
Comptroller of the Currency).
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investment banking directly, and in addition made affiliation with an
organization so engaged illegal."2z5
In 1984, the Supreme Court again discussed the necessity of
separating commercial and investment banking in Securities Industry
Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.226
In that case, the dispute arose from an interpretation of Glass-
Steagall by the Federal Reserve which allowed banks to market third
party commercial paper.227 Reaffirming its decision in Camp, the
Court stated that Congress enacted Glass-Steagall to isolate
commercial from investment banking.228  The Court explained that
Glass-Steagall reflected Congress' determination that "certain
investment banking activities conflicted in fundamental ways with
the institutional role of commercial banks., 229  Therefore, the Court
held that banks may not sell commercial paper because it is a
"security" subject to the prohibitions of section 16 and 21.30
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decisions in Camp and
SIA, it may still be argued that banks may conduct the activity under
the "incidental powers" language of section 24 (Seventh).2 31  Even if
underwriting revenue bonds is not included in the power of banks to
225. See id. The Court noted that one effect of Glass-Steagall was to abolish the
security affiliates of commercial banks. See id. (citing H.R. Doc. No. 76-70, pt.2, at 59
(1939)).
226. 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
227. See id. at 139. "Commercial paper" generally involves unsecured, short-term
promissory notes issued by commercial entities and payable on a stated maturity date,
typically less than nine months. See Kenneth V. Handal, The Commercial Paper Market
and Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 362,363-64 (1972).
228. See SIA, 468 U.S. at 144-47. The Court noted that through flat prohibitions Glass-
Steagall sought to "separat[e] as completely as possible commercial from investment
banking." See id. at 147-48 (citing Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v.
Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 70 (1981)). The Court determined that Congress
specifically had two concerns in mind when it enacted the Act: the inherent risk associated
with the securities business and the effect of losses on consumer confidence in the banking
system. See id. at 145. The Court noted that it was this "crisis of confidence" that
contributed to the runs on bank in the 1920s which ultimately hampered these banks'
solvency. See id.
229. Id. at 145. Congress recognized that various conflicts of interest exist when a bank
represents clients both as a commercial and investment bank. See id. Because customers
look to banks as a source of investment advice, it might be difficult for banks to give
impartial advice about securities which they might be underwriting. See id. at 145-46.
Conflicts might also arise because banks must incur substantial start up costs to build and
maintain a securities distribution system, the Court noted. See id. at 146.
230. See id. at 160; see also supra notes 53-54.
231. See supra note 9.
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"discount and negotiate other evidences of debt," section 24
(Seventh) could still be interpreted to allow the underwriting of
revenue bonds as an incidental power which is "necessary to carry on
the business of banking."232  The Supreme Court's decision in
NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. (VALIC) 213 gives banks greater power to expand into
other areas deemed to be "incidental" to the business of banking,
perhaps even investment banking.234 In VALIC, the Court held that
the Comptroller has discretion to authorize activities not expressly
enumerated under section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act.235
The Court cautioned, however, that the OCC does not have unlimited
power and emphasized that if the intent of Congress was clear
regarding a statute, it was "the end of the matter."236 Alternatively,
explained the Court, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issues," the OCC's interpretation will stand if
it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute., 237
Ultimately in VALIC, the Court upheld the Comptroller's
determination that banks may sell annuities because they are
232. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994). The courts have determined that "necessary"
bank powers include those which are "convenient and useful." See Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (Ist Cir. 1972) (holding that operation of a travel agency did not
qualify as a "convenient and useful" activity). The OCC likewise looked to the "convenient
and useful" standard to justify the use of operating subsidiaries. See Rules, Policies, and
Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,353 (1996).
233. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
234. The Court noted that banks had the authority to deal in securities well before
enactment of Glass-Steagall, and that the insertion of the section limitations made sense
"only if banks already had authority to deal in securities, authority presumably
encompassed within the 'business of banking' language which dates from 1863." Id. at
258. The Court noted that both the Glass-Steagall and the McFadden Acts served only to
limit activities already part of the business of banking. See id. (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1927,
§ 2(b), 44 Stat. 1226; Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 407-08 (1987)
(noting that banks conducted securities activities on a widespread basis before 1927); 2 F.
REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS, 389-93 (1951) (detailing
the involvement of early national banks in securities transactions)).
235. Id. at 258 n. 2 (1995). VALIC gave the OCC more power to define permissible
activities than an earlier circuit court decision allowing banks to engage in activities
"convenient and useful" to the conduct of the business of banking. See Arnold Tours, Inc.
v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972).
236. VALIC, 513 U.S. at 257 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). It also said the OCC's judgment should
be given "controlling weight" if it "fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable
in light of the legislature's revealed design" Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
237. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
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essentially financial investment instruments which congressional
authorization permits them to broker.1
31
Even if section 16 does prohibit banks from directly selling
municipal revenue bonds themselves, it does not apply to an
operating subsidiary, according to the OCC. 39  Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed whether the section 16 restrictions
should apply to operating subsidiaries of banks, it has decided a
similar issue regarding whether section 16 applies to a nonbank
subsidiary of a bank holding company. 4° In 1981, the Supreme
Court upheld a determination by the Federal Reserve that a nonbank
subsidiary of a bank holding company could act as an investment
adviser.2 4' In so holding, the Court explained that section 16 applies
only to banks and not to bank holding companies. 42 Whether such
reasoning would also apply to operating subsidiaries of national
banks is not clear.
In addition to the confusion regarding whether restrictions on
banks also apply to operating subsidiaries, is the uncertainty as to
whether the OCC has the power to permit any securities activities at
all. As the SIA argued in its comment letter, permitting bank
subsidiaries to engage in ineligible securities activities through an
operating subsidiary might be construed as beyond the power granted
238. See id. at 260.
239. See Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 21. Zions had argued the
restrictions of Glass-Steagall should not apply to bank subsidiaries because they were not
mentioned in the statutes. See Zions Memorandum, supra note 128, at 14. Zions said the
"plain meaning [of the statutes] must be honored absent compelling evidence of a different
Congressional intent." See id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (1984)).
240. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46
(1981). The lawsuit stemmed from the determination by the Federal Reserve under
Regulation Y that bank holding companies and their nonbanking subsidiaries were
permitted to serve as investment advisors because the activity was "closely related to
banking." See id. at 48-49. The Court rejected arguments presented by the Investment
Company Institute, a trade association of investment companies, that the regulation violated
sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall. See id.at 53-55.
241 See id. at 55.
242. See id. at 58 n.24. The Court rejected the argument that a bank and its bank
holding company should be treated as one entity when applying section 16. See id. Even
though 16 serves as an outright prohibition against banks engaging in underwriting
activities, the Court noted that the section should not be applied to organizations affiliated
with banks because they are dealt with in other sections of Glass-Steagall. See id. The
Court applied logic that might also be helpful to operating subsidiaries, holding that bank
affiliates may be authorized to engage in some activities which banks may not engage in
themselves. See id. at 60. The Court explained that a less stringent standard should be
applied to bank holding companies than to banks. See id. at 60 n.26.
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to the OCC under section 93a of the Bank Act.243 Section 93a grants
the Comptroller of the Currency the power to "prescribe rules and
regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the office," but does
not allow him to issue regulations relating to the McFadden Act or
Glass-Steagall. 244 The OCC avoided the issue of section 93a's
applicability by arguing that the approval did "not confer authority
on national banks (or their operating subsidiaries) that they do not
have under existing law., 241 The OCC said that because the proposed
activity is part of the business of banking under section 24 (Seventh),
section 93a was "simply inapplicable. 2 46  Even if section 93a were
applicable, it has yet to be used to restrict the OCC's regulating
powers in any significant way.247 In addition, any narrow reading of
the OCC's power is difficult to square with the Supreme Court's
holding in VALIC that an OCC interpretation should have
"controlling weight" when it defines a term that is reasonable in light
of the legislature's revealed intent.248
The OCC's approval of Zions' application to engage in
revenue bond underwriting can be justified by the agency's
243. See SIA Memorandum, supra note 128, at 4; see also supra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text.
244. 12 U.S.C. § 93a (1994). Section 93a was added to the National Bank Act by the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). See
DIDMCA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 708, 94 Stat. 132, 188 (1980). While granting new power
to prescribe regulations, the House Conference Report on the bill noted that the
"rulemaking provision carries no authority to permit otherwise impermissible activities of
national banks with specific references to the provisions of the McFadden Act and the Glass
Steagall Act." See SIA Memorandum, supra note 128, at 5 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-
842, at 83 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 298, 313). The Senate expressed its
concerns that the Comptroller "not use formal rulemaking authority, as opposed to
interpretative rulings which are requested from time to time, to decide issues in relation to
the Glass-Steagall Act." See id. at 6 (citing S. REP. No. 96-368, at 13 (1979), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 249). Oddly, this language seems to implicitly acknowledge a
distinction between the OCC directly issuing a regulation relating to Glass-Steagall and
approving an activity deemed to fall within the Act's provisions.
245. Decision of the Comptroller, supra note 127, at 29 n.77.
246. Id.
247. Since its enactment, there have been only two cases interpreting the OCC's power
under the provision. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the authority of the OCC to promulgate regulations
establishing the terms by which national banks may offer or purchase adjustable-rate
mortgages which preempted conflicting state laws); Conference of State Bank Supervisors
v. Lord, 532 F. Supp. 694 (D. Co. 1982) (holding section 93a restricts the Comptroller's
power to issue regulations in certain areas, but the power is otherwise broad in scope).
248. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
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determination that section 24 (Seventh) permits banks to directly
"discount and negotiate" such instruments.249 If the OCC had
determined instead that the proposed activity was not part of, but
only "incidentar' to the business of banking, support for the OCC's
decision could be found in the Supreme Court's VALIC decision.50
However, given strong wording in Supreme Court dicta against the
mixture of commercial and investment banking in the same entity,
the OCC determination could be challenged as going beyond the
powers of the Comptroller.2 1' All these issues are also clouded
somewhat by the lack of any clear ruling as to whether the
prohibitions of section 16 apply to a subsidiary. 2
V. CONCLUSION
The OCC made the correct decision regarding the ability of
banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. Section 24 (Seventh)
already permits banks to underwrite a wide variety of bonds,
including general municipal bonds.2 3  There is little basis to
distinguish revenue bonds from other government bonds that banks
themselves may already directly underwrite. But the OCC's
determination that the proposed activity falls squarely within a
bank's power to "discount and negotiate evidences of debt" is
somewhat troubling because such a determination makes the specific
authorizations provided later in the statute superfluous.2 4  However,
249. See supra notes 133-34, 214-15 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 220-30, 243-48 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 137, 216 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 133-34, 214-15 and accompanying text. The OCC's decision
makes it somewhat unclear which activities impermissible to a national bank are
permissible to its subsidiary. Based on the language of section 24 (Seventh), a national
bank almost certainly would not be allowed to underwrite the sale of municipal revenue
bonds because it does not fall within one of the express categories of bonds enumerated in
the statute. However, because the proposed activity is to be conducted through a
subsidiary, the OCC seems to have applied a laxer standard by including revenue bonds
within the definition of "evidences of debt" which banks may underwrite. Perhaps the OCC
is attempting to apply the Federal Reserve's "closely related to banking" standard instead of
its own "business of banking" standard. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8), 24 (Seventh) (1994).
In fact, the OCC approved the Zions application, in part, because the activity complied with
certain Federal Reserve requirements. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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allowing banks to underwrite these bonds will add much needed
competition to the municipal revenue bond market2 " and thus reduce
municipal borrowing costs. The activity has the support of the
Comptroller, who has greater power to authorize new activities for
national banks after VALIC.256 Supreme Court warnings against the
danger of mixing commercial and investment banking have less
resonance in the case of government obligations then with corporate
investments." 7
Authority exists to support approval of NationsBank's
application to engage in RELF, but the bank's self-imposed
limitation of five percent of its Tier 1 capital is too high. The
NationsBank application might result in a subsidiary owning real
estate at the end of the lease term worth only twenty-five percent of
the acquisition cost, which it might then have to release or sell at a
significant loss.2"' The potential magnitude of such a loss is
substantial because five percent of the Tier 1 capital of a bank the
size of NationsBank could be several hundred million dollars." 9
Although NationsBank argued that the "flow of capital" will not be
disturbed, the bank has failed to account for the fact that fewer funds
will be available to consumers during the period properties to be
leased are constructed. Despite these concerns, the OCC will likely
approve the application so that operating subsidiaries may conduct
the same activities as are now allowed to subsidiaries of bank
holding companies under the revised Regulation Y.260
255. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 107, 202 and accompanying text.
259. For the years ended December 31, 1995 and 1996, NationsBank, N.A. had Tier 1
capital of $4.623 and $5.137 billion respectively. See NATIONSBANK CORP., 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT (1997). The Tier I capital amounts may increase even further, as large banks, such
as NationsBank, consolidate their interstate subsidiary banks pursuant to recent changes in
federal banking law. See Rick Brooks, NationsBank is Challenged by Texas in Bid to Halt
Combination of 2 Units, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1997, at B13. NationsBank is currently
facing litigation over its plans to consolidate its Texas banks into it largest banking unit,
which is located in Charlotte. See id.; see also Haley M. Brady & Mark V. Purpura, The
Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997: The Impact of Interstate Branching on the Dual
Banking System, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 230 (1998).
260. See supra note 202. This would finally allow real estate lease financing to the same
extent as has been allowed for the leasing of personal property, including leases to non-
public entities. See supra note 195. In its application, NationsBank acknowledged that
while the Federal Reserve has not determined that real estate development is a permissible
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If it approves the application by NationsBank to engage in
real estate development, the OCC will puncture the largest-ever hole
in the section 29 wall prohibiting real estate investments by banks.
Banks already own large amounts of real estate,2 61 and much of it is
in the form of "bank premises. 262 Allowing the purchase of real
estate through operating subsidiaries will provide a way for banks to
increase their real estate holdings far beyond simply "premises."
However, the S&L crisis should serve as a reminder of the potential
pitfalls stemming from excessive real estate investment by financial
institutions. In addition, allowing real estate development by banks
without sufficient safeguards could lead to an unfair competitive
advantage for banks over nonbanking entities26' and to a subsequent
accumulation of even more massive economic power in banks.
For now, it remains unclear how much the new Regulations
will enable national banks to engage in new activities through their
subsidiaries. For example, if the OCC approves NationsBank's real
estate development and RELF applications, the OCC will certainly
encounter a deluge of applications from other banks seeking to
expand into new real estate ventures.264 The OCC will also encounter
resistance from Congress, which covets its role in effecting financial
activity for bank affiliates, it had not issued regulations expressly barring such activities
either. See Letter from Richard K. Kim to Steven J. Weiss, supra note 63, at 7.
Section 4(c)(8) does allow a bank holding company to invest in shares of a
company which the Federal Reserve has determined "to be so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1994). Regulation Y provides a laundry list of exempt nonbanking activities under 4(c)(8),
none of which allows real estate development. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22 (1997).
261. For the fiscal years ended December 31, 1996 and 1997, NationsBank Corporation,
which includes NationsBank, N.A., had $2.712 and $3.225 billion, respectively, in premises
and equipment. See NATIONSBANK CoRP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
262. A bank's investment in "premises" is limited, somewhat, by the rules in section
371d. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
263. The Federal Reserve expressed concerns that competition with developers might
affect the judgment of banks making loans. See Letter from William W. Wiles to Eugene
Ludwig, supra note 84, at 2-3. The NAR pointed out several potential abuses: that banks
might pass information regarding promising real estate from borrowers to their subsidiary,
that banks might be reluctant to loan money on development projects that they might also
be contemplating, and that banks' status as real estate developers might influence their
decision on whether or not to foreclose on a property. See Letter from Stephen D. Driesler
to the OCC, supra note 88, at 4.
264. Banks seem ready to enter the municipal revenue bond market as well, with some
banks, such as North Carolina-based Wachovia Corporation stating even before approval of
the Zions application that it planned to establish a subsidiary to underwrite municipal
revenue bonds. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, supra note 6, at 2.
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services reform and is increasingly belligerent towards attempts by
the OCC to weaken some of the banking industry's current barriers
261to other commercial activities.
The OCC's issuance of new Part 5 Regulations has resulted
in jockeying for position among the various banking regulatory
agencies.266 The Federal Reserve expressed its intention to apply the
limitations of sections 23A and 23B to the activities of bank
operating subsidiaries.267  The Federal Reserve also approved
265. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Alfonse M. D'Amato, who has criticized the
Part 5 Regulations, confronted Comptroller Ludwig during a hearing and charged that the
OCC has been "undermining the dual banking system, threatening the primacy of state
insurance regulation, and usurping the prerogatives of Congress." OCC 's Op-Sub Rule
Comes Under Increasing Attack from Greenspan, D'Amato, BANKING POL'Y REP., May 19,
1997, at 6, available in WESTLAW, Bnkpr Library. Senator D'Amato called Ludwig "the
czar of czars" and said the operating subsidiary rule is one way that Ludwig has shown a
"clear disregard" of his authority to interpret the National Bank Act. Id. In contrast, House
Banking Committee Chairman James Leach was supportive, and described the Part 5
Regulations as "a step toward bank modernization." John R. Wilke, Comptroller Plans to
Let Many Banks Enter a Wide Range of New Businesses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996, at
A2.
266. The competition to ease banking regulations has led to an intense rivalry between
the OCC and the Federal Reserve to attract banks to one agency over the other. See John R.
Wilke, supra note 265, at A2. Banks which are organized as holding companies are
regulated by the Federal Reserve, while national banks are regulated by the OCC. See id.
By opening up the possibility of the "universal bank" which also conducts insurance and
securities underwriting activities through operating subsidiaries, the Part 5 Regulations
threaten the need for bank holding companies. See Note, The New American Universal
Bank, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1310, 1327 (1997) (concluding that Part 5 promotes efficiency
within the banking industry by breaking the regulatory monopoly which the Federal
Reserve once had over activities deemed "closely related to banking"); Melanie L. Fein,
OCC's Op-Sub Rule Could Spark Changes in Banking Structure, BANKING POL'Y REP., Jan.
6, 1997, at 6, available in WESTLAW, Bnkpr Library (arguing that many banks may
question the need to retain a bank holding company in light of recent changes allowing
banks to engage in more activities). The Federal Reserve continues to argue that new
activities should be conducted through a bank holding company instead of an operating
subsidiary. See Atkins, supra note 181, at 348. Chairman Greenspan testified to the House
Banking Financial Institutions Subcommittee that allowing banks to enter new lines of
business through bank subsidiaries instead of bank holding companies would effectively
extend the subsidy of federal deposit insurance to these subsidiaries, and thus give the
subsidiaries a competitive advantage over non-bank-owned companies in the same line of
business. See id. Testifying as part of a later panel, Comptroller Ludwig disagreed,
disputing that there was any net subsidy enjoyed after taking into effect the cost of
regulations imposed on banks. See id. The moves by the OCC could also result in lawsuits
from industry trade associations which have expressed strong opposition to the banks
moving into their practice areas.
267. See Fed Expected to Seek Curbs on Subsidiaries in Challenge to OCC, AM.
BANKER, June 30, 1997, at 2. The proposal would apply sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act to any bank subsidiary which engages in activities impermissible to the
bank itself. See id. Some observers questioned the need for the Federal Reserve rule since
the Part 5 Regulations already require operating subsidiaries to abide by these rules. See id.
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changes to Regulation Y that allow expanded activities within bank
holding companies. The FDIC moved to permit greater powers for
state banks, especially in the areas of real estate development.
269
Several questions remain unanswered about the application
process itself. The Federal Reserve has provided a laundry list of
activities it has determined are appropriate for the subsidiaries of
bank holding companies."' The OCC, however, has refused to
indicate which activities not permitted for national banks are
considered appropriate for their subsidiaries.271  Furthermore,
although the OCC said that it will review applications on a "case-by-
case" basis, it has not explained whether and to what extent approval
of one application establishes precedent for future applications. 2  In
addition, the relative weight given to each factor by the OCC in
considering an application is unclear. Although the OCC announced
three main criteria, it also suggested several additional factors it will
consider.273 Moreover, the OCC has yet to provide a fixed timetable
regarding when applications will be approved. Although it received
the two NationsBank applications a few months before the Zions
application, the OCC has not announced a decision on the
NationsBank requests.274
The regulations proposed by the Federal Reserve drew an unusually negative response, but
are expected to be issued by the Federal Reserve nonetheless. See Olaf de Senerpont
Domis, Industry, Regulators Blast Fed Plan for Subsidiaries, AM. BANKER, Oct. 7, 1997, at
2. The proposed regulations were opposed by, among others, the FDIC, the OCC, and the
OTS. See id.
268. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y), 62 Fed.
Reg. 9290 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 225). See generally Michael Frachioni,
Proposed Amendments to Regulation Y: An Overview, 114 BANKING L.J. 335, 346 (1997)
(concluding that the most significant aspect of the proposed regulations is that they expand
permissible nonbanking activities).
269. See supra note 185.
270. See supra notes 202, 260, 268 and accompanying text.
271. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22 (1997). Comptroller Ludwig has refused to identify which
activities the OCC might approve, saying that "a laundry list is a terrible mistake." Olaf de
Senerpont Domis, supra note 6, at 2.
272. The NAR argued that approval of one application made by a bank might serve as
sufficient precedent for the bank to establish other subsidiaries to participate in the activity.
See Letter from Stephen D. Driesler to the OCC, supra note 88, at 5. The Federal Reserve
opposed the NationsBank applications because of the "precedent its approval would set."
Letter from William W. Wiles to Eugene Ludwig, supra note 84, at 1.
273. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
274. The NationsBank applications had yet to be ruled on by the end of February, 1998,
but are expected to be acted upon within the first half of 1998. See Regulatory Roundup:
Action Expected Soon, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 1998, at 4.
1998] 309
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Perhaps the new Regulations will prod Congress into finally
taking measures that allow banks to participate in a broader scope of
real estate and financial activities. But some people have suggested
just the opposite; they contend that Congress might instead pass
legislation restricting the ability of banks to offer products or
services outside of traditional banking areas."' Whatever the
eventual outcome of the various operating subsidiary applications,
one thing is certain: the OCC has established itself as a major force
in shaping the future of banking law.
WILLIAM T. MCCUISTON*
275. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 3, at 784 (asserting that OCC approval of the
NationsBank and Zions applications could result in congressional action that limits the
scope of bank powers).
* The author wishes to express his thanks to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency for providing much of the information needed to write this Comment. The author
also wishes to thank his editor and friend, John M. DeAngelis, for carefully editing this
Comment.
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